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INTRODUCTION

For several decades, Minnesota commissions, task forces, and
advocacy groups have warned that our education system has been
failing to meet twenty-first century challenges for students who come
to school with educational disadvantages.1 Three constitutional
chllenges have been made to Minnesota’s education system, though
each was founded on an inadequate theory. Although three
constitutional challenges have been launched in the last three
decades, all three have been founded on inadequate legal theories.
The central thesis of this article is that Minnesota’s education system
needs to be reinvigorated with ambitious litigation that remedies the
state’s failure to provide an education that meets state standards. As
discussed throughout this article, “state educational standards” or
“state standards” refer to the robust statutory framework included in
Minnesota Statutes Chapers 120B, 124D, and 125A.2
†
Partner, Rinke-Noonan. The author has been a school board member in
St. Cloud since 2004, holds a Masters in Teaching degree specializing in education
of disadvantaged students, and, before attending law school, taught mathematics
and social studies in Washington, D.C. and New York. The author gratefully
acknowledges the research assistance of Ryan Merker, a Mitchell Hamline School
of Law graduate and attorney at Dorsey and Whitney.
1. E.g., MINN. EDUC. EQUITY P’SHIP, STATE OF STUDENTS OF COLOR AND
AMERICAN INDIAN STUDENTS REPORT 2 (2016), https://mneep.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/04/SOSOCAI-Report-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/BR8FN8PM] (“This Report is informed by the very persistence of those
disparities through a period of intense reform efforts.”); DAN MUELLER, WILDER RES.
FOUND., EDUCATION DISPARITIES–INCOME: A CRADLE TO COLLEGE PERSPECTIVE 7
(2014), https://www.wilder.org/Wilder-Research/Publications/Studies/STEM%
20in%20Minnesota/Education%20Disparities%20%20Income,%20A%20Cradle%
20to%20College%20Perspective.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5FXC-P9MY];
MINN.
DEP’T OF EDUC., FUNDING EDUCATION FOR THE FUTURE 4 (2011),
http://www.amsd.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/EFReport-2.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/4P3L-ZL8C] (discussing the little progress made in closing wide gaps in
reading and math proficiency by race and by economic status between 2006 and
2010); BUDGET TRENDS STUDY COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE 7 (2009),
https://www.minnpost.com/sites/default/files/asset/0/0p728b/0p728b.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6XZU-H9LG].
2. MINN. STAT. §120B.02, subdiv. 1 (2017) (“Educational Expectations And
Graduation Requirements for Minnesota’s Students”); MINN. STAT. § 120B.02,
subdiv. 1(a) (2017) (requiring the commissioner to adopt rigorous academic
standards); MINN. STAT. § 120B.021 (2017) (listing required academic standards);
MINN. STAT. § 120B.018, subdiv. 2 (2017) (defining “academic standard” as “a
summary description of student learning in a required content area under section
120B.02 or elective content area under section 120B.022”); MINN. STAT. § 120B.11
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In Skeen v. State, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed that the
Education Clause of the Minnesota Constitution provides a
fundamental right to an education, including the right to “what is
necessary to provide an adequate level of education which meets all
state standards.”3 However, because the Skeen plaintiffs conceded
that their school districts were already meeting all existing state
standards, the court had no occasion to enforce the fundamental
right to education and thus denied the relief sought.4
Despite this holding, two recent cases—Forslund5 and
Cruz-Guzman6—challenged only discrete components of Minnesota’s
complex education system. The plaintiffs in both cases failed to tie
their challenges to state standards, and did not seek relief under
Skeen that would “provide an adequate level of education which meets
all state standards.”7 Rather, the plaintiffs based their claims on the
amorphous concept of an “adequate” education.8 Both cases were
dismissed as nonjusticiable by two separate Minnesota Court of
Appeals panels.9
(2017) (listing programmatic standards and requiring school boards to align
strategic plan with world’s best workforce requirements); MINN. STAT. § 120B.024
(2017) (discussing course credit and academic standards); MINN. STAT. § 120B.11,
subdiv. 1(c) (2017) (defining “World’s Best Workforce”); LEAPS Act, MINN. STAT.
§§ 124D.65, subdiv. 6, 124D.58–.64 (2017); MINN. STAT. § 125A (2017) (“Special
Education and Special Programs”); MINN. STAT. §§ 125A.01, subdiv. 2 (defining
“Dyslexia”), 125A.56, subdiv. 1 (2017) (“Alternate Instruction Before Assessment
Referral”).
3. 505 N.W.2d 299, 315–16 (Minn. 1993) (“Thus, we believe that challenges
to the state’s financing of education beyond what is necessary to provide an
adequate level of education which meets all state standards must be evaluated, not
under strict scrutiny, but rather under the rational basis test, and we will not set
aside the legislature’s determination unless the funding system employed somehow
impinges upon the adequacy with which the state meets the fundamental right to a
general and uniform education.”).
4. Id. at 316.
5. Forslund v. State, No. A17-0033, 2017 WL 3864082, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App.
Sept. 5, 2017) (discussing tenure and seniority).
6. Cruz-Guzman v. State, 892 N.W.2d 533 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017) (discussing
racially and economically imbalanced schools).
7. Skeen, 505 N.W.2d at 316 (emphasis added).
8. The use of the term “adequate” to describe a high-quality education and
the financial resources necessary to provide education that meets state educational
standards creates confusion. This article uses the term “adequate” in conjunction
with the provision of resources.
9. Forslund, 2017 WL 3864082, at *9 (“[R]esolution of appellant’s claims . . .
‘is a task for the legislature and not the judiciary’. . . .”); Cruz-Guzman, 892 N.W.2d
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Skeen, Forslund, and Cruz-Guzman all failed to seek the systemic
changes necessary to address the needs of students who have
traditionally failed to thrive in Minnesota’s educational system. Even
if the courts granted all the relief sought in these constitutional
challenges, Minnesota’s system still would still fail to produce an
education that the legislature decrees meets twenty-first century
standards.10 This is because no plaintiff urged the court to require
the state to provide adequate financial resources or reform
Minnesota’s delivery system to meet state educational standards. As
a result, the three branches of Minnesota government are presiding
over a dysfunctional education system, and they are doing so in a
dysfunctional way.11
Article XIII, section 1, of Minnesota’s Constitution (“Education
Clause”) mandates that the legislature “establish a general and
uniform system of public schools and to make such provisions . . . as
will secure a thorough and efficient system of public schools
throughout the state.”12 In fulfillment of the constitution, the
legislature established a rigorous statutory framework of academic
standards and programmatic requirements that, if implemented
thoroughly and efficiently, would meet the educational
requirements of the twenty-first century.13 To deliver new state and
federally mandated education in Minnesota, the state must spend at
least two billion dollars per biennium or more.14 However, two
at 541 (dismissing respondent’s claims because they presented a nonjusticiable
political question).
10. See Christopher Magan, 15 Years Later, MN Schools are More Segregated, and
Achievement Gap has Barely Budged, PIONEER PRESS (Aug. 21, 2017),
http://www.twincities.com/2017/08/18/15-years-later-mn-schools-are-more-segre
gated-and-achievement-gap-has-barely-budged/ [https://perma.cc/9T26-L2XP].
One study ranked Minneapolis dead last in big city graduation rates for 2013.
Measuring Up, Educational Improvement & Opportunity in 50 Cities, CTR. FOR
REINVENTING PUB. EDUC. (October 2015); see also Minnesota’s Graduation Gap, MINN.
PUB. RADIO (Mar. 7, 2016), https://www.mprnews.org/story/2016/03/
07/graduation-gap-by-the-numbers [https://perma.cc/62YU-T75G] (last visited
Dec. 23, 2017); MINN. EDUC. EQUITY P’SHIP, supra note 1, at 39.
11. See infra Part IV.A.
12. MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1.
13. See Minn. Assessments, MINN. TECHNICAL MANUAL 1 (2007),
http://www.leg.state.mn.us/webcontent/lrl/guides/AcademicStandards/MCAHis
tory.pdf. [https://perma.cc/TB34-364F]; see also MINN. STAT. § 120B.30 (2017)
(mandating a system of statewide testing and accountability for students enrolled in
grades 3, 5, and 7, originally enacted as MINN. STAT. § 121 (1997)).
14. See JOHN MEYERS ET AL., DETERMINING THE COST OF EDUCATION IN
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governors and the Minnesota Department of Education (MDE) have
scrupulously avoided providing official notification to the legislature
of that fact.15 In doing so, the state has failed to provide resources
sufficient to achieve those standards and programmatic
requirements and has failed to create a systemic organizational
framework that would allow local districts to meet state standards
and requirements even if they had every last dollar they needed.16
Adequate funding is not enough.17 Two leading authorities on
configuring schools to deliver high performance for disadvantaged
students emphasize the importance of structural changes to
accompany the appropriation of adequate resources.
The education system will need to implement enormous
changes for the country to attain these lofty goals. Change
will be required in school and classroom organization,
curriculum programs, instructional practices, professional
development, use of computer and information
technologies, and the way the system recruits, develops,
and manages its most important talent—teachers and
principals.18
Karin Chenoweth, who has been studying schools that produce
extraordinary educational results, despite student demographics
traditionally associated with failing schools, writes:
As long as schools are organized in traditional ways, schools
will be entirely dependent on the social capital students
bring to their schooling. Schools serving low income
students will for the most part be low performing; schools

MINNESOTA: CONTINUING THE WORK OF THE GOVERNOR’S EDUCATION FUNDING
REFORM TASK FORCE 10 (2005), [https://perma.cc/3TC8-89EG] (identifying a
shortfall of nearly one billion dollars per year).
15. See infra Part IV.B.
16. Id.
17. See Jared S. Buszin, Beyond School Finance, 62 EMORY L.J. 1613, 1631 (2013)
(“The increasing judicial distrust of education finance suits has led some scholars
to suggest that education reform litigants should reframe their suits so they do not
appear simply to be seeking greater funding.”)
18. Allan R. Odden & Sarah J. Archibald, DOUBLING STUDENT PERFORMANCE . . .
AND FINDING THE RESOURCES TO DO IT at ix (2009); see Linda Darling-Hammond et
al., How High-Achieving Countries Develop Great Teachers, STAN. CTR. FOR OPPORTUNITY
POL’Y IN EDUC. 1, 2 (Aug. 2010) (“Studies of U.S. professional development show
that a small minority of American teachers receive the kind of sustained, continuous
professional development that research indicates can change teaching practice and
improve student achievement.”).
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serving middle class and upper middle-class families will
appear to be reasonably successful.19
For decades, Minnesota has sought to close the achievement
gap solely by mandating outcomes and launching new, inadequately
funded initiatives.20 The results demonstrate the futility of trying to
make significant changes in educational outcomes for economically
disadvantaged students by only changing the legislatively mandated
outcomes.21 Minnesota students are still waiting for their school
districts and legal advocates to bring a case—predicated on state
education standards—that will transform Minnesota’s public
education system and bring it into compliance with its constitution.
This article begins by describing the urgency of a more rational
system of public education calculated to achieve state standards.22
Then, it discusses the legal and educational significance of
Minnesota’s transformation from a “seat-based” educational system,
existing when Skeen was decided, to a proficiency-based system in the
1990s.23 This article next examines the funding adequacy decision in
McCleary v. State,24 which addresses one essential component of a
thorough, efficient twenty-first century education system: the
correlation of revenues to the cost of meeting state requirements.25
This article further argues that Minnesota needs its own McCleary

19. KARIN CHENOWETH, SCHOOLS THAT SUCCEED: HOW EDUCATORS MARSHAL THE
POWER OF SYSTEMS FOR IMPROVEMENT 6 (2017).
20. See, e.g., Timothy D. Lynch, Education as a Fundamental Right: Challenging the
Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 953, 984–86 (1998) (discussing this
problem generally); Gerald Von Korff, Underfunded Mandate Reform: Are They Serious,
or Are They Just Talking, JVONKORFF ON EDUCATION (Feb. 20, 2010, 7:03 AM),
http://jvonkorff.blogspot.com/2010/02/underfunded-mandate-reform-are-they.
html [https://perma.cc/XU3Q-UZLX] (discussing this problem in Minnesota).
But see, e.g., Minnesota Education Initiatives Work Together to Secure $6 Million in
Government Funding, THE INTERSECTOR PROJECT (Aug. 23, 2016, 6:23 PM),
http://intersector.com/minnesota-education-initiatives-work-together- to-secure-6million-in-government-funding/ [https://perma.cc/U74A-8RMN].
21. Von Korff, supra note 20 (arguing that unfunded mandates are “breaking
the backs of public school districts across the state”). See generally William S. Koski &
Bob Reich, When “Adequate” Isn’t: The Retreat from Equity in Educational Law and Policy
and Why it Matters, 56 EMORY L.J. 545 (2006).
22. See infra Part II.
23. See infra Part III.A.
24. 269 P.3d 227 (Wash. 2012).
25. See infra Part IV.B.
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decision that seeks financial adequacy as well as organizational and
operational authority.26
This article then argues that the two most recent attempts to
challenge the educational system, Cruz-Guzman and Forslund, have
failed to state claims enforcing the constitutional mandate; they
merely asked the courts to tinker with individual components of it.27
The plaintiffs’ failure to ground constitutional claims on
legislatively-established educational standards prevents those cases
from creating precedent applicable to a suit that forces the state to
provide economically disadvantaged students with the education the
legislature requires.28 Finally, the article proposes reform to the way
the three branches of government deliver the thorough, efficient
system that the Minnesota Constitution requires.29
II. HISTORIC BACKGROUND
A.

Minnesota’s Educational Crisis

Minnesota is experiencing a dramatic change in the ratio of
productive workers in the labor force as Baby Boomers retire.30 The
aging of Minnesota’s largest generational cohort has extraordinary
implications for the state’s economic and workforce development
priorities—health care, public assistance, social service, and
education.31 Thus, it is critical that Minnesota fully educates the
upcoming generations.

See infra Part IV.C.
See infra Part IV.D.
See infra Part V.
See infra Parts V.A–B.
Megan Dayton, Will Minnesota Soon Be Laboring to Find Workers?, ADA TO
ZUMBROTA BLOG (July 20, 2017), https://mn.gov/admin/demography/news/adato-zumbrota-blog/?id=36-303494
[https://perma.cc/8C76-D3C6]
(“With
Minnesota Baby Boomers aging into retirement, a new labor force landscape is
emerging across the state—one in which the number of workers is expected to
continue to grow, but only very slowly, into the foreseeable future.”).
31. From 1970 to 1980, Minnesota’s labor force grew by about 450,000
according to the State Demographer. Population Data: Our Projections, MINN. STATE
DEMOGRAPHIC CTR., https://mn.gov/admin/demography/data-by-topic/populat
ion-data/our-projections [https://perma.cc/5JUY-GYEY] (last visited Dec. 15,
2017). Since that time, net labor force growth has fluctuated between 300,000 and
400,000 per decade. Id. “In the coming two decades, the under 18 population will
grow modestly, gaining about 32,000 between 2015 and 2035. Meanwhile, the state’s
65 and older population will grow much more rapidly, adding more than half a
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
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In 2009, the Budget Trends Commission warned of a rising
dependency ratio—persons active in the labor force versus those
who are not.
As baby boomers reach retirement age and Minnesota’s
labor force growth rates start to decline, the dependency
ratio will begin to rise. This will mean that the earnings of
the working age population will need to be stretched
further to support the state’s economically dependent
population.32
As this demographic change occurs, the percentage of the
student population that does not achieve educational proficiency is
growing.33 More children are poor; more children are coming to
school without the necessary family support systems; and more
children are coming to school with accumulated educational
deficits.34
These large gaps, in combination with the significant
demographic changes already underway, are threatening
the economic future of our country. Thus, closing racial
and ethnic gaps is not only key to fulfilling the potential of
people of color; it is also crucial to the well-being of our
nation. . . . [T]here are enormous payoffs to closing the
gaps through public policies. If the United States were able
to close the educational achievement gaps between
native-born white children and black and Hispanic
children, the U.S. economy would be 5.8 percent—or
nearly $2.3 trillion—larger in 2050.35

million people (510,000+) over those same years. As a result of this growth, in 2035,
the age 65+ group is expected to eclipse the under 18 population for the first time
in our state’s history.” Id.
32. ASS’N OF MINN. CTYS., COUNCIL ON SERV. INNOVATION, SOLVING TODAY’S
CHALLENGES THROUGH INNOVATIVE AND SUSTAINABLE SOLUTIONS 11 (Sept. 16, 2010),
https://www.lcc.leg.mn/inactive/csi/AMCMNREDESIGNPresentation9-162010.p
df [https://perma.cc/PBX3-SJAN].
33. Race Matters: Unequal Opportunities in Education, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND.
(2006), http://www.aecf.org/m/resourcedoc/aecf-racemattersEDUCATION-2006
.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QBD-CZLJ].
34. See id.
35. MINN. EDUC. EQUITY P’SHIP, supra note 1, at 19 (quoting Robert Lynch &
Patrick Oakford, The Economic Benefits of Closing Educational Achievement Gaps, CTR.
AM. PROGRESS (Nov. 10, 2014, 8:00 AM)); see Population Data: Our Projections, supra
note 31 (estimating that the percent of Minnesota’s population represented by
people of color (those self-identifying as one or more races other than White or
Latino) is projected to grow from 14% in 2005 to 25% by 2035).
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According to the Annie E. Casey Foundation, “[t]he
consequences of failing to ensure educational success are
far-reaching. The adverse impact is long term and reflected in future
employment prospects, poverty and incarceration rates, as well as
limited capacity to participate in the world community.”36
In Minnesota, advantaged students perform quite well
statistically, even under the new state proficiency standards.37 Of
students not eligible for free and reduced lunch (FRL), 71% score
proficient on the Minnesota Comprehensive Assessment (MCA-III)
of reading.38 However, only 42% of non-English-speaking
FRL-eligible students meet the proficiency standards.39 Statewide,
38% of non-ELL black students score proficient in reading, and the
proficiency rate for non-ELL, FRL-eligible students is five points
lower in Minneapolis, at 33%.40 The statistics for mathematics and
science are similar.41
36. Race Matters, supra note 33. Additionally, the Minnesota Private College
Research Foundation Report warned that:
[F]rom 2003 to 2013, the number of high school graduates in Minnesota
will decrease by 10.3 percent. . . . The overall decline of 10.3 percent in
Minnesota masks widely divergent racial/ethnic patterns: 18.7 percent
decline in the number of white high school graduates[,] 51.9 percent
growth in the number of minority high school graduates[, and] [t]he
share of Minnesota high school graduates who are students of color will
grow from just 12 percent to nearly 20 percent of all high school
graduates. Because most of the decline is projected among students who
are currently among the most likely to attend college and most of the
growth is in students who are least likely to attend college, we project a
decline of 11.6 percent in baccalaureate degree production from all
Minnesota post-secondary education institutions—private and public.
This decline will be from about 27,000 graduates in 2007 to 24,000 in
2017.
Challenge: Fewer High School Graduates, Fewer College Graduates, MINN. PRIVATE COLL.
COUNCIL 1 (2005), https://www.leg.state.mn.us/archive/leg/minutes/database/
84-s-1285-1376-20050215-a.pdf [https://perma.cc/BXF3-QWP3].
37. See Gerald Von Korff, MDE Proficiency Data Promotes False School District
Comparisons, JVONKORFF ON EDUC. (Sept. 26, 2017, 5:10 AM), http://jvonkorff.
blogspot.com/2017/09/mde-proficiency-data-promotesfalse.html [https://perma.
cc/52XW-RA9R] (comparing the proficiency rates of FRL eligible students

and non-FRL eligible students).
38. MINN. REPORT CARD, MINN. DEPT. OF EDUC., https://rc.education.
state.mn.us [https://perma.cc/D7RJ-E3FX] [hereinafter MINN. REPORT CARD]
(providing statistics for Minnesota test scores).
39. Von Korff, supra note 37.
40. See MINN. REPORT CARD, supra note 38.
41. See id.
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Despite years of active efforts at the state and federal levels,
Minnesota’s gaps in performance between FRL-eligible and
non-FRL-eligible students, and between white and non-white
students, have remained persistently resistant to change.42 Statewide
math proficiency rates for FRL-eligible students fell to 38.5% in
2017.43 For the last several years, black proficiency rates in reading
and science have remained in the mid-30% range across
Minnesota.44 Despite the persistence of these low academic
indicators, there is strong evidence that properly organized schools,
with sufficient resources, can dramatically improve the performance
of lower income students.45
The education gap between children of high and low
socio-economic status begins before kindergarten.
The existence of significant education inequalities at the
starting gate poses a strong challenge to education policy.
Programs and policies must account for the fact that
schools and teachers serve students who do not start school
on equal terms. Many students haven’t participated in
preschool education and care, nor have they engaged in
equal amounts of developmental and play time with adults.
Not only are children unequally prepared to learn when
they enter school, but, as research shows, their chances of
attending unequally resourced schools are high, as they are
much more likely to share school with children who face
the same circumstances . . . . In short education policies
must grapple with the relative disadvantages that many
42. See Magan, supra note 10 (“Minnesota schools have grown more segregated
and the state’s nation-leading academic achievement gap refuses to close.”); see also
Anthony Lonetree et al., Minnesota Test Results Show Math Down a Bit, Reading Flat,
STAR TRIB. (Aug. 7, 2017, 8:39 PM), http://www.startribune.com/the-mca-testscores-reading- math-proficiency-exam-flat/438990683/ [https://perma.cc/NRJ8P8UG] (“[T]he gaps in results between white and minority students statewide have
barely budged in reading and math . . . .”).
43. See MINN. REPORT CARD, supra note 38.
44. Id. (providing proficiency rates for black students from 2015–17).
45. See HIGHER GROUND ACADEMY, https://high-schools.com/directory/
mn/cities/st-paul/higher-ground-academy/270014002719/#section-1
[https://
perma.cc/FJ2W-R9HN] (last visited Mar. 25, 2018) (noting that Higher Ground
Academy, a St. Paul charter with a FRL eligible rate of 97.4%, has a non-ELL black
reading proficiency rate of 57%, more than double the rate for St. Paul); MINN.
REPORT CARD, supra note 38. Minnesota’s failure to systematically implement
strategies that have demonstrated success could justify an article on its own.
Extended school days, high quality early childhood education, robust summer
learning, and co-teaching are all examples.

2018]

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

689

children face—disadvantages that are concentrated and
compounded, and accumulate over time.46
To overcome this educational deficit, public education must
deploy more resources and must do so more effectively.47 However,
neither of these changes will occur unless the judicial system
enforces the Minnesota Constitution.
B.

Education as “the Great Equalizer of the Conditions of Men”

The authors of the Minnesota Constitution crafted a
constitutional mandate designed to assure that our educational
system would meet the very challenges Minnesota faces today.48 The
Minnesota Constitution’s Education Clause was drafted under the
influence of the common school movement,49 inspired by Horace
Mann and others.50 Mann’s thesis was that “public education had the
power to become a stabilizing as well as an equalizing force in
American society” . . . and that “Education . . . is the great equalizer

46. Emma Garcia, Inequalities at the Starting Gate: Cognitive and Noncognitive
Skills Gaps Between 2010–2011 Kindergarten Classmates, ECON. POL’Y INST.
(June 17, 2015), http://www.epi.org/publication/inequalities-at-the-starting-gatecognitive-and-noncognitive-gaps-in-the-2010-2011-kindergarten-class [https://per
ma.cc/964H- Y794].
47. See Matthew Lynch, Allocating Resources to Improve Student Learning,
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 19, 2011, 6:48 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/mat
thew-lynch-edd/allocating-resources-to-i-_b_1018778.html [https://perma.cc/9AA

3-L966] (“Allocating and developing resources to support improvement in
teaching and learning is critical to school reform efforts.”).
48. See Minn. CONST. art. XIII, § 1 (“[I]t is the duty of the legislature to establish
a general and uniform system of public schools.”).
49. David L. Kiehle, History of Education in Minnesota, Address at the Annual
Meeting of the Minnesota Historical Society (Jan. 19, 1903), in MINNESOTA HISTORICAL
SOCIETY COLLECTIONS, EDUCATION IN MINNESOTA 366 (1905), https://www.loc.gov/
resource/lhbum.0866e_0388_0435/?sp=2 [https://perma.cc/SZZ7-ZT4F].
50. Barbara Winslow, Education Reform in Antebellum America, GILDER LEHRMAN
INST. AM. HIST. (Nov. 14, 2017) (“Mann’s ideology was based upon a strong sense of
Protestant Republicanism that was rooted in a secular, non-sectarian morality. He
believed that education was a child’s ‘natural right,’ and that moral education
should be the heart of the curriculum. To accomplish education reform, Mann
advocated state-controlled boards of education, a more uniform curriculum, and
greater state involvement in teacher training.”). Horace Mann (1796–1859) was a
member of the Massachusetts state legislature, and then secretary of the
Massachusetts Board of Education. Id.
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of the conditions of men—the balance-wheel of the social
machinery.”51
Thus, the Education Clause reflects the conviction of Mann’s
contemporaries: that the provision of an appropriate and adequate
education was central to the survival of a democracy.52 Recognizing
the inherent vulnerability to legislative whim in funding, the
Minnesota Constitution’s authors did not simply grant the power to
establish a school system, but instead used mandatory language that
requires the legislature53 to “establish a general and uniform system
of public schools. The legislature shall make such provisions by
taxation or through other means that will secure a thorough and
efficient system of public schools throughout the state.”54
Over 150 years, the Minnesota legislature’s assessment of the
education level required to “equalize the conditions of men” evolved
with changing social, economic, and demographic conditions. The
flexibility of Minnesota’s education clause allowed for this

51. Id. (citation omitted); see HORACE MANN, Sec’y of the Bd. of Educ. in Mass.,
TWELFTH ANNUAL REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE MASSACHUSETTS STATE BOARD OF
EDUCATION (1848), https://genius.com/Horace-mann-twelfth-annual-report-tothe-secretary-of-the-massachusetts-state-board-of-education-1848-annotated [http:/
/perma.cc/K3B5-QJDH]; A Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge, 79
Va. Gen. Assembly (June 18, 1779), https://founders.archives.gov/
documents/Jefferson/01-02-02-0132-0004-0079 [http://perma.cc/GAQ9-DDVD]
(“[I]t is believed that the most effectual means of preventing [tyranny] would be, to
illuminate, as far as practicable, the minds of the people at large, and more
especially to give them knowledge of those facts, which history exhibiteth, that . . .
they may be enabled to know . . . .”).
52. See Josh Kagan, Note, A Civics Action: Interpreting “Adequacy” in State
Constitutions’ Education Clauses, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2241, 2263–64 (2003).
53. The suggestion in the appellate panel’s Cruz-Guzman decision that this duty
falls solely upon the legislature is a careless misreading of the Constitution. Under
our constitutional system, the legislature acts through legislation, but that
legislation does not become law without the Governor’s signature. See Tom Todd,
MAKING LAWS (Dec. 2002), http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/
mkglaws.pdf [https://perma.cc/K39A-LXYC]. If the educational duty fell solely on
the legislature, that would imply that the Governor could not veto legislation
necessary to fulfill the constitutional mandate. Moreover, a central function of the
executive is to provide data, policy guidance, and recommendations necessary to
craft constitutionally compliant legislation.
54. MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1. The first legislative session of the new State of
Minnesota in 1858 provided for a uniform system of public schools to be supported
by the sale of school lands, and for three state normal schools in Winona, Mankato,
and, St. Cloud. See Kiehle, supra note 49.
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adaptation.55 In the mid-1800s, the common school movement
fostered a basic McGuffey’s reader-based education that was deemed
sufficient to accommodate the then-existent agrarian-based
economy.56
Then, at the turn of the century, the Minnesota legislature
recognized that the education system could not remain stagnant,
while serving as the “great equalizer of the conditions of men”57
envisioned by the Constitution. To this end, in 1899, the legislature
passed a compulsory attendance law requiring children age eight to
sixteen, living within the borders of a school district or city, to attend
public or private school.58 In 1913, the Minnesota Supreme Court
heard and rejected a challenge to the legislature’s efforts to elevate
Minnesota’s public-school system by creating centralized shared
high schools, thus reaffirming the court’s recognition of the robust
role of our Education Clause.59 Justice Hallam60 wrote that the words
of the Constitution “were not [merely] a grant of power to the
Legislature, for all the powers there mentioned would have existed
without such grant. They were inserted as a mandate to the Legislature,
prescribing as a duty the exercise of this inherent power.”61
As of 1910, less than half of the United States population had
completed an eighth-grade education,62 a statistic that remained

55. See MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1 (directing the legislature to create provisions
that “will secure a thorough and efficient system of public schools”).
56. Rosemary C. Salomone, Common Schools, Uncommon Values: Listening to the
Voices of Dissent, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 169 (1996) (discussing generally the
common school movement).
57. Winslow, supra note 50.
58. Act of Apr. 14, 1899 Minn. Laws 248–250, https://www.revisor.mn.gov/law
s/?year=1899&type=0&group=General+Laws&doctype=Chapter&id=226 [https://
perma.cc/PK7W-5ED9].
59. Assoc. Schs. of Indep. Dist. No. 63 v. Sch. Dist. No. 83, 122 Minn. 254, 142
N.W. 325 (Minn. 1913).
60. After his retirement from the court in 1924, Justice Hallam served on the
faculty, then as Dean and President, of St. Paul College of Law (now Mitchell
Hamline School of Law). See Oscar Hallam, MINN. STATE LAW LIBR.,
https://mn.gov/law-library/research-links/justice-bios/oscar-hallam.jsp [https://
perma.cc/PT7V-VBAR].
61. Assoc. Schs. of Indep. Dist. No. 63, 122 Minn. at 258, 142 N.W. at 327
(emphasis added).
62. NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 120 YEARS OF
AMERICAN EDUCATION: A STATISTICAL PORTRAIT 7 (1993), https://nces.ed.gov/
pubs93/93442.pdf. [https://perma.cc/ZS33-JNZF]. In the last half of the 19th
century, only about half of all 5- to 19-year-olds were enrolled in school. Id. at 6.

692

FIXING AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM

[Vol. 44:2

relatively constant until 1940.63 Compulsory attendance—and a
great expansion of Minnesota public high schools—began to
transform the education levels of the next generation of Minnesota
students. By 1991, the enrollment rate for five- to nineteen-year-olds
rose to ninety-three percent for blacks, whites, males, and females
alike.64 Although the median years of education rose dramatically,
American leaders and decision-makers became increasingly
convinced that our public school system was not preparing our
young to compete in the new global economy.65
III. THE TRANSFORMATION OF MINNESOTA’S EDUCATION SYSTEM
A.

State Standards in a Seat-Based Versus Proficiency-Based System

In 1983, President Ronald Reagan’s National Commission on
Excellence in Education issued A Nation at Risk.
Our Nation is at risk. Our once unchallenged preeminence
in commerce, industry, science, and technological
innovation is being overtaken by competitors throughout
the world . . . . We report to the American people that while
we can take justifiable pride in what our schools and
colleges have historically accomplished and contributed to
the United States and the well-being of its people, the
educational foundations of our society are presently being
eroded by a rising tide of mediocrity that threatens our very
future as a Nation and a people.66
“The overall enrollment rates for 5- to 19-year-olds rose from 51 percent in 1900 to
75 percent in 1940.” Id. In 1940, “[o]nly 6 percent of males and 4 percent of females
had completed 4 years of college . . . .” Id. at 7.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 6.
65. See, e.g., Joel Klein, The Failure of American Schools, THE ATLANTIC (June
2011), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/06/the-failure-ofamerican-schools/308497/ [http://perma.cc/H23E-E85A].
66. NAT’L COMM’N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., A NATION AT RISK (1983),
https://www2.ed.gov/pubs/NatAtRisk/risk.html [https://perma.cc/G6KR-QB2L]
[hereinafter A Nation at Risk] (finding that (1) some twenty-three million American
adults were functionally illiterate by the simplest tests of everyday reading, writing,
and comprehension; (2) about 13% of all seventeen-year-olds in the United States
could be considered functionally illiterate, with functional illiteracy among minority
youth that may be as high as 40%; (3) average achievement of high school students
on most standardized tests is now lower than twenty-six years prior, when Sputnik
was launched; and (4) over half the population of gifted students do not match their
tested ability with comparable achievement in school).
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Although it fostered a new focus on proficiency, A Nation at Risk
was not focused merely on what students knew and how they
performed on tests.67 It also focused on the ability to solve problems
and apply those skills in future careers and civic endeavors.68
Many 17-year-olds do not possess the “higher order”
intellectual skills we should expect of them. Nearly 40
percent cannot draw inferences from written material; only
one-fifth can write a persuasive essay; and only one-third
can solve a mathematics problem requiring several steps.69
Thus, a national movement began to examine the perceived failures
of public education and to institute reforms to assure that all
students capable of doing so learned at high levels of proficiency.70
As of 1983, Minnesota’s definition of state-mandated, adequate
education might well have served as “Exhibit A” in A Nation at Risk’s
indictment of state laws setting the standards for public school
districts. Specifically, Minnesota’s legislative requirement for
elementary education merely included a minimum length of school
day, a minimum number of school days per year,71 and certain
licensure and staff ratio requirements.72 The state, for example, did
not require all students to be able to read by third grade and
provided no sanction for a lack of reading and math proficiency.73
Instead, for middle and junior high schools, the state simply
established a chart prescribing the minimum number of hours
required for each subject, along with certain staffing requirements.74
For secondary schools, the state only required 120 hours of
credit.75 No meaningful proficiency or outcome-based state standard
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. (emphasis added).
70. These reform efforts culminated in 2001 in the federal No Child Left
Behind Act and related standards-based reform initiatives undertaken by virtually
all the states over the past two decades. Unfortunately, these efforts have made
limited progress in achieving the goal of raising the performance of disadvantaged
students. Michael A. Rebell, The Right to Comprehensive Educational Opportunity, 47
HARVARD C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 47, 49 (2012).
71. MINN. R. 3500.1200 (1985) (repealed 1993).
72. MINN. R. 3500.1400 (1985) (repealed 1993).
73. MINN. R. 3500.1100 (1985) (repealed 1993).
74. MINN. R. 3500.1600, 3500.1800 (1985) (repealed 1993).
75. The regulation stated only that “[s]atisfactory completion of at least 120
hours shall be the basis for a credit course, or subject, in grades 9, 10, 11, and 12 in
four-year secondary schools and in grades 10, 11, and 12 in three-year secondary
schools. Length of periods and frequency of meeting may be determined by the
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existed for high school graduation.76 A local school district could
deliver basic consumer math—a form of applied arithmetic—or
algebra II as its exit mathematics requirement.77 No state
requirement prohibited school districts from granting a diploma to
students who did not know that ten percent of one hundred is ten,
or that two-thirds is greater than one-half. In addition, the state did
not prohibit school districts from granting a diploma to students who
were unable to write a complete sentence or understand a paragraph
written at an eighth-grade level.
This system of education that existed in the 1980s was a
“seat-based” or “teaching-based” education system.78 In a seat-based
education system, the state mandates that each school district supply
a minimum amount of total “seat time” allocated to particular
subjects.79 Stripped to essentials, a seat-based paradigm delivers time
district.” 7 Minn. Reg. 592–93 (Oct. 18, 1982).
76. See Minnesota Issues Resource Guides, Academic Standards, MINN. LEGIS.
REFERENCE LIBR., https://www.leg.state.mn.us/lrl/guides/guides?issue=academic
[https://perma.cc/58BP-DQMT] (last reviewed July 2017) [hereinafter Academic
Standards].
77. See 7 Minn. Reg. 586 (Oct. 18, 1982); see also id. at 591–92 (listing the
minimum clock hours for mathematics and communication skills). A review of the
state rules shows that the minimum content standards lacked any requirement of
demonstrated proficiency. See id. Standards for testing and promotion were
delegated to local districts. See id. at 587. The Minnesota Department of Education
kept the recommended curriculum on file, but imposed no mandatory
requirement. See MINN. CODE OF AGENCY RULES, RULES OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION (Sept. 15, 1982).
78. See Academic Standards, supra note 76 (“Historically, Minnesota high schools
awarded diplomas based on Carnegie units (‘seat time requirements’) or course
credits completed by students. Critics maintained that this system provided no
statewide standards on subject content and no statewide assessment of what students
had learned.”); see also ARTHUR LEVINE, EDUCATING SCHOOL TEACHERS 12 (2006),
http://edschools.org/pdf/Educating_Teachers_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/
2ARN-8AJL] (“Industrial societies focus on achieving common processes and
information societies seek common outcomes. Reflecting this change, the focus of
schooling has shifted from teaching to learning—to the skills and knowledge
students must master, rather than the skills and knowledge teachers must teach.
This is not a rhetorical difference. It turns education on its head as the focus shifts
from assuring common processes for all schools (e.g., 12 grades, 180-day school
years, and five major subjects a semester) to assuring common outcomes for all
students. The emphasis on learning outcomes mirrors this change. The states now
set minimum acceptable achievement levels, the highest in history, that students
must attain, and mandate testing regimens to assess whether students are meeting
state standards.”).
79. Sean Cavanagh, States Loosening “Seat Time” Requirements, EDUC. WEEK (Mar.
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in a chair, with a teacher at the front of the classroom.80 These
minimal requirements allow local public school districts to
unilaterally determine the quality of the teaching and the
curriculum.
The lack of state mandates in a seat-based system pose problems
for students. For instance, because teachers need only “deliver
education” for a set number of hours, nothing prohibits schools
from increasing class sizes or cutting necessary teacher resources,
such as time for professional development.81 Additionally, because
the seat-based system does not impose proficiency requirements that
must be met before graduation, state educational standards could be
satisfied without regard to the quality of the educational outcomes
attained.82
As discussed above, statistically, economically disadvantaged
students start out significantly behind.83 Under the seat-based
paradigm, estimating a district’s cost to deliver education was far less
demanding.84 It was possible to limit spending without impairing a
district’s ability to meet state requirements, because a district could

5, 2012), https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2012/03/07/23biz-state.h31.html
[http://perma.cc/9UXW-6RMU].
80. Id.
81. This stripping of teacher resources and professional development time
directly impacts teacher quality. In his seminal study of effective practices, author
John Hattie argues that the four most important elements to teacher knowledge
and behavior are: (1) observation of actual classroom methods; (2) microteaching;
(3) video/audio feedback; and (4) practice. JOHN HATTIE, VISIBLE LEARNING: A
SYNTHESIS OF OVER 800 META-ANALYSES RELATING TO ACHIEVEMENT 2783–85 (2009)
(Kindle ed.).
82. See Dale Frost, Moving From Seat-Time to Competency-Based Credits in State
Policy: Ensuring All Students Develop Mastery, INACOL (Apr. 12, 2016),
https://www.inacol.org/news/moving-from-seat-time-to-competency-based-creditsin-state-policy-ensuring-all-students-develop-mastery/ [https://perma.cc/F734-E7R
Y] (discussing the benefits to transitioning from a seat-based system to a
competency- or proficiency-based system).
83. See Garcia, supra note 46.
84. The cost of teaching thirty students for a fixed number of course hours
could be computed by calculating the direct cost of supplying the required number
of instructional hour, instructional materials, and indirect costs. See FUND THE
CHILD, infra note 146 and accompanying text. The cost of supplying differentiated
instruction, remediation, tutoring, and other instructional services necessary to
deliver students to a predetermined proficiency is a function of the students’
readiness. Id.
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produce an hour of seat time for any student at the same price,
regardless of the student’s educational challenge.85
If state funding was reduced, or if collective bargaining drove
up district costs beyond state revenue increases, the district could
compensate by increasing class sizes, cutting the textbook budget, or
lowering educational rigor, all without compromising state
standards.86 If a student’s preparation was substantially behind the
standard curriculum, the district could voluntarily provide remedial
instruction to the extent that it could afford to do so or place the
student in a less rigorous course of study.87 But, there was no
requirement that a district take any measures if proficiency began to
fall, as state standards required only that students sit in seats for the
requisite hours.88
The seat-based system also had implications for non-financial
aspects of the delivery system. For schools to significantly improve
educational outcomes for economically disadvantaged students, the
school staff must function as a coherent, collaborative team, under
masterful leadership, to implement a comprehensive plan and
appropriate curriculum.89 The seat-based school was an individual
sport and the teacher the athlete; a collaborative team was not
essential to meet seat-based education requirements.
It is likely that most Minnesota lawyers, as well as legislators, do
not understand the true cause of Minnesota’s failure to achieve high
levels of proficiency among disadvantaged students because most of
us are products of classrooms in which teaching was an individual
sport. Our school’s outcome was merely the sum of what individual
teachers acting alone could accomplish in disconnected and isolated
classrooms. If our classmates failed to master the material, that was
simply a failure on the part of the students, their families, or their
socio-economic statuses.90 The students served their minimum

85. See Academic Standards, supra note 76 (“[The seat-based] system provided no
statewide standards on subject content and no statewide assessment of what students
had learned.”).
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See Frost, supra note 82.
89. See infra Part III.C.
90. See Michael Price, 6 Reasons Why We Must Stop Blaming Teachers for Our Failing
Education System, HUFFPOST (June 23, 2014), https://www.huffingtonpost.
com/michaelprice/6-reasons-why-we-must-sto_b_5520170.html [https://perma.cc
/B3EC-N238] (identifying several common sources of blame for failed education).
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required seat-time, and hence state requirements were satisfied.91
Those of us educated under the old paradigm have trouble
envisioning a school that really leaves no child behind because the
system capable of accomplishing that is beyond our experience.
Pundits and politicians who cannot conceive a school as an
organic team often assert that schools must be failing because of bad
teachers.92 They make the mistake of assuming that to transcend the
tremendous educational deficit discussed above, one need only
place a good teacher in front of the classroom, and, as if by magic,
the students will somehow surpass a full standard deviation deficit,93
or more.94 Rather, good teaching results come from a great team
that is well-led and properly mentored,95 with curriculums and
91. See generally MINN. DEP’T OF EDUC., Highlights of State Education Polices From
1970-2000, State Education Policies - The 1980s (2000), https://mn.gov/mnddc/past
/pdf/00s/00/00-HSE-MDE.pdf [https://perma.cc/X27C-BYUX].
92. See, e.g., Jonathan Zimmerman, Why Is American Teaching So Bad?, THE NEW
YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, (Dec. 14, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/
articles/2014/12/04/why-american-teaching-so-bad/
[https://perma.cc/L5X6V6UE] (critiquing American teaching as a primary cause of low proficiency);
George Leef, A Key Reason Why American Students Do So Poorly, FORBES (Oct. 24, 2013),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/georgeleef/2013/10/24/a-key-reason-whyamerican-students-do-poorly/#7985be412349 [https://perma.cc/ UG8L-A2WX].
This claim, that the central cause of the achievement gap is bad teachers, is implied
in the allegations of the plaintiffs in Forslund v. State, A17-0033, 2017 WL 3864082
(Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 2017), and its California companion, Vergara v. State, 209
Cal. Rptr. 3d 532 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016).
93. See Roland G. Fryer & Steven D. Levitt, Falling Behind: New Evidence on the
Black-White Achievement Gap, 4 EDUC. NEXT 4, 1 (Fall 2004) (“On average, black
students typically score one standard deviation below white students on
standardized tests—roughly the difference in performance between the average 4th
grader and the average 8th grader.”). It is a mistake to confuse the task of
overcoming this deficit in a single selected individual student, or a select group of a
few hundred students—something often described as “beating the odds.”
Overcoming this deficit statistically for all of Minnesota’s nearly 100,000 black
students requires systemic change. See MINN. REPORT CARD, MINN. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
https://rc.education.state.mn.us/#demographics/orgid—999999000000__group
type—state—p—1 [https://perma.cc/946N-5JQR].
94. See Zimmerman, supra note 92.
95. See INSIDE OUR SCHOOLS: TEACHERS ON THE FAILURE AND FUTURE OF
EDUCATION REFORM 61 (Brett Gardiner Murphy ed., 2017) (“When beginning
teachers are just starting out, they should be paired with a strong mentor. Beyond
that, schools and districts need to help teachers build their skill set by providing
them with extended and connected professional development. When it comes to
improving their performance, research has demonstrated that teachers work best in
collaboration with other teachers. This requires inquiry groups and self-study
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teaching practices tailored to the students served.96 The school is
making up for hundreds of hours of deficits in reading and other
educational activities that should be occurring in students’ homes.97
Almost inevitably, that is going to take more teaching time, with
additional support staff needed for mentoring, tutoring, and
differentiated instruction.98
Perhaps the greatest failure of the seat-based system is that it did
not demand that students exit their classrooms mastering grade-level
materials and did not provide the organizational support to make it
possible to address the challenges faced by disadvantaged students.99
As Chenoweth points out, the culture of education often convinced
educators that students who are poor or from a racial or ethnic
minorities simply could not be expected to reach a high level of

programs.” (citations omitted)).
96. Id.
97. See generally MARILYN BINKLEY & TREVOR WILLIAMS, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC.
STATS.,
READING
LITERACY
IN
THE
UNITED
STATES
(1996),
https://nces.ed.gov/pubs/96258.pdf [https://perma.cc/2USG-JG47].
98. See generally KARIN CHENOWETH & CHRISTINA THEOKAS, GETTING IT DONE:
LEADING ACADEMIC SUCCESS IN UNEXPECTED SCHOOLS (2011) (discussing the need for
teachers to work hard to master the skills and knowledge necessary to teach students
and expect them to learn); ANTHONY S. BRYK ET AL., ORGANIZING SCHOOLS FOR
IMPROVEMENT: LESSONS FROM CHICAGO (Anthony S. Bryk ed., 2010) (identifying and
discussing a comprehensive set of practices and conditions that are key factors for
education improvement, including school leadership, the professional capacity of
the faculty and staff, and student-centered learning climate); Odden & Archibald,
supra note 18.
99. See generally CHENOWETH & THEOKAS, supra note 98. Until the 1990s, the
Minnesota Department of Education lacked a uniform state standardized test to
track student performance. ERNEST C. DAVENPORT ET AL., OFF. OF EDUC.
ACCOUNTABILITY, UNIV. OF MINN., THE MINNESOTA BASIC SKILLS TEST: PERFORMANCE
GAPS FOR 1996 TO 2001 ON THE READING AND MATHEMATICS TESTS, BY GENDER,
ETHNICITY, LIMITED ENGLISH PROFICIENCY, INDIVIDUAL EDUCATION PLANS, AND SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS 1–4 (2002), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/
237796516_The_Minnesota_Basic_Skills_Test_Performance_Gaps_for_1996_to_20
01_on_the_Reading_and_Mathematics_Tests_by_Gender_Ethnicity_Limited_Engl
ish_Proficiency_Individual_Education_Plans_and_SocioEconomic_Stat [https://
perma.cc/Z8JD-U7TL]. Under the profiles of learning law, Minnesota began to
deliver a basic skills test to all students in 1996. Id. That testing system disclosed
major gaps in learning between white student and other racial groupings, and
between upper and lower income students. Id. at 41–44.
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proficiency100; Chenoweth terms this the “demographic excuse.”101
There was no reason to reorganize the educational delivery system
to attain proficiency for all because the state did not demand
proficiency, nor did it train educators to expect it.102
One alternative to the seat-based model is a proficiency- or
competency-based system. In the proficiency-based system, school
success also depends upon the school principal and leadership’s
ability to meld the entire staff into a coherent team that is greater
than the sum of its parts.103 That is because state standards in a
proficiency-based system include student competency requirements
for each grade level.104 Minnesota’s transition from a seat-based to
proficiency-based system provided the necessary foundation upon
which the three branches of government could begin to create a
system capable of ensuring quality education to each student.105
B.

Skeen v. State: Reaffirmation of the Constitutional Mandate

This article’s central thesis is that Minnesota’s education system
needs to be reinvigorated by ambitious litigation that remedies the
state’s failure to provide education that meets state standards. To
advance that thesis, it is critical to analyze the Minnesota Supreme
Court’s 1993 decision in Skeen v. State.106

100. Karin Chenoweth, A Primer on Reading Your Child’s Language Abilities, WASH.
POST (Dec. 19, 2002), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/2002/12/
19/a-primer-on-reading-your-childs-language-abilities/8319afb1-b9dc-42fd-869f-70
45c5a94278 [https://perma.cc/QW9V-PVZW] (discussing how teachers and future
teachers have been told repeatedly in the past few decades that they could have little
effect on this demographic reality). Instead of reacting to the Coleman Report by
thinking deeply about what schools need to do to offset the ill effects of poverty and
discrimination on academic achievement, the education profession used it as what
could be called the “demographic excuse”—poor children do not do well because
they are poor, and schools can’t do anything to change that. See id.
101. Id.; see Rebell, supra note 70, at 47 (“While vital school improvement efforts
must continue, the country’s ambitious national educational goals cannot be met
unless the nation understands and confronts the core problem underlying the
achievement gap: the extensive pattern of childhood poverty that inhibits
educational opportunity and educational achievement.”).
102. See MINN. R. 3500.0500(3) (1985) (repealed 1993); see also Rebell, supra
note 70, at 47.
103. See CHENOWETH & THEOKAS, supra note 98.
104. See MINN. R. 3501.0640–.1345 (2017).
105. See infra Part III.C.
106. 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993).
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At the launch of the Skeen litigation, Minnesota did not have
proficiency standards.107 Minnesota’s system, by any statistical
performance measure, performs well for advantaged students.108
Nationally, advantaged students arrive at school with larger
vocabularies,109 greater phonemic awareness, and better social
coping skills than disadvantaged students.110 Parents of advantaged
students can make up for the deficiencies and assure that their child
remains on track for success, even if the school fails to provide the
essential educational building blocks.111 To close the achievement

107. See MARGARET E. GOERTZ, STATE EDUCATIONAL STANDARDS IN THE 50 STATES:
AN
UPDATE
Tables
1–3,
EDUC.
TESTING
SERV.
(Mar.
1988),
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/j.2330-8516.1988.tb00278.x/epdf
[https://perma.cc/6DL3-99NQ].
108. See MINN. REPORT CARD, supra note 38 (charting test scores and graduation
rates across racial, socioeconomic, and other categories).
109. See Karin Chenoweth, Piece by Piece: How Schools Solved the Achievement Puzzle
and Soared, AM. EDUCATOR 15, 15–16 (Fall 2009); FRAN LEHRAT ET AL., PAC.
RESOURCES FOR EDUC. & LEARNING, RESEARCH-BASED PRACTICES IN EARLY READING
SERIES: A FOCUS ON VOCABULARY 6 (2004) (“Young students who don’t have large
vocabularies or effective word-learning strategies often struggle to achieve
comprehension. Their bad experiences with reading set in motion a cycle of
frustration and failure that continues throughout their schooling.”); E.D. Hirsch,
Jr. & Louisa C. Moats, Overcoming the Language Gap, 25 AM. EDUCATOR 5, 8–9 (2001)
(discussing the gap in word knowledge between advantaged and disadvantaged
children as “word poverty.” The authors define word poverty as “partial knowledge
of word meanings, confusion of words that sound similar but that contrast in one or
two phonemes, limited knowledge of how and when words are typically used, and
knowledge of only one meaning or function when there are several.”).
110. See Julia B. Isaacs, Starting School at a Disadvantage: The School Readiness of Poor
Children, BROOKINGS INST. 4 (Mar. 19, 2012), https://www.brookings.edu/
research/starting-school-at-a-disadvantage-the-school-readiness-of-poor-children/
[https://perma.cc/KQ39-FFZT]; (“[P]oor children are much more likely than
other children to score very low on math and reading skills: three out of ten poor
children (30 percent) score very low on early reading skills, compared to only 7
percent of children from moderate- or high-income families. Differences are
smaller but still substantial on the behavioral and health measures. More than half
(52 percent) of poor children score very low on at least one of the five measures,
and so fail to be school ready, compared to one-quarter of children from
moderate- or high-income families.”).
111. See id. (“Poor children in the United States start school at a disadvantage in
terms of their early skills, behaviors, and health. Fewer than half (48 percent) of
poor children are ready for school at age five, compared to 75 percent of children
from families with moderate and high income, a 27-percentage point gap.”). See
generally CHENOWETH & THEOKAS, supra note 98 (focusing on what some
disadvantaged schools have done to combat their issues).
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gap, this difference must be made up with mentoring, tutoring,
additional learning time, outstanding differentiated instruction, and
appropriate curriculum.112
Given Minnesota’s dismal achievement gap, it is remarkable
that Minnesota school districts and Minnesota lawyers failed, at the
time of Skeen, to challenge the existing system as constitutionally
inadequate.113 Yet, despite the fact that Skeen was brought in the
shadows of A Nation at Risk, neither the Skeen plaintiffs nor any other
school advocacy groups followed the example of ambitious
constitutional cases brought in other states.114 Indeed, Justice Page,
writing in dissent, expressed his surprise that the plaintiffs sought
relief for advantaged students.115 Moreover, the court specifically
referenced the Washington Supreme Court’s Seattle School District
decision, which noted “that a ‘general and uniform system’ had not
been established because the funding for ‘basic education’ was not
derived from ‘dependable and regular’ tax sources.”116

112. See supra note 98 and accompanying sources; cf. Dora W. Klein, Beyond
Brown v. Board of Education: The Need to Remedy the Achievement Gap, 31 J.L. & EDUC.
431 (2002) (discussing various remedies that may help close the educational
achievement gap).
113. See generally Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993) (holding in part
that various portions of Minnesota’s funding provisions for school districts had been
adequately addressed by legislature, and any disparities did not violate the state
constitution).
114. See, e.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 655 N.E.2d 661, 666 (N.Y.
1995) (explaining that the Education Article of the New York State Constitution
requires the State “to offer all children the opportunity of a sound basic
education”); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 94 (Wash. 1978) (holding
that the state’s constitutional duty is to “make ample provision for the education of
all children” in terms of the “educational opportunities needed in the
contemporary setting to equip children for their role as citizens and as potential
competitors in today’s market as well as in the marketplace of ideas”). See Rose v.
Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d
273 (N.J. 1973).
115. Skeen, 505 N.W.2d at 320 (Page J., dissenting) (“[E]ducation is a
fundamental right under the Minnesota Constitution, the state’s duty toward its
children is not satisfied unless it provides equal educational opportunities for all
children. This duty is not satisfied when some children receive an ‘adequate’
education while others receive a more-than-adequate education.”).
116. Id. at 311 (citing Seattle Sch. Dist., 585 P.2d at 97). Seattle School District
later served as the foundation for the Washington Supreme Court’s subsequent
decision in McCleary v. State. 269 P.3d 227, 235 (Wash. 2012).
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Justice Page was correct. The Skeen plaintiffs were not, as a
statistical matter, disadvantaged.117 On the contrary, they
represented an association of school districts serving primarily white
students outside the metropolitan area118—school districts that, in
most other constitutional litigation contexts across the country,
would have been regarded as educationally advantaged.119 The
plaintiff districts in Skeen actually conceded to the court that their
students were already receiving all state-mandated services and an
education in compliance with state educational standards.120
Instead, the Skeen plaintiffs focused on equality of taxation.121
Consequently, the Skeen decision explained that fundamentally
different rules apply to equality of taxation in comparison to equal
delivery rights of state-mandated educational programs.122 The
school districts in Skeen claimed that their lower property tax base
made it more difficult for them to support referendum levies,
supplemental revenues, and excess levies.123 As the court examined
whether the unequal taxing power, resulting from the existing
finance system, was unconstitutional, the court felt compelled to
determine whether our constitution treated public education as a
117. Skeen, 505 N.W.2d at 301.
118. See id.
119. Id. (“The majority of the plaintiff districts belong to the Association of
Stable and Growing School Districts (ASGSD). These districts have been
experiencing a higher than average enrollment increase, with their enrollment
rising by 22% between the 1973–74 and 1987–88 school years. Meanwhile, state-wide
enrollment declined by 12% over the same time period. Although the resident
income and home values in plaintiff districts are somewhat above the state average,
their school districts have property tax base per pupil unit (ppu) below the state
average.”). This was because they lacked strong commercial and industrial tax bases.
Id.
120. Id. at 315 (holding the state of Minnesota’s system of education funding
formula survives strict scrutiny analysis because plaintiffs concede they already
receive an adequate education).
121. Id. at 306 (“The crux of the plaintiffs’ claim is that these additional revenue
sources which are above and apart from the wholly equalized basic formula result
in wealth-based funding disparities among Minnesota school districts.”).
122. Id. at 320 (Page J., dissenting) (“This duty [prescribed by the constitution
to provide an ‘adequate’ education] is not satisfied when some children receive an
“adequate” education while others receive a more-than-adequate education.”).
123. Id. at 306 (“[S]tate funding is fully equalized for the approximately 93% of
state funding attributable to the basic revenue formula. However, the remaining 7%
of funding is not equalized and is often left to local control.”) These funding
streams include referendum levies, supplemental revenues, and debt service levies.
Id. at 301–302.
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fundamental right.124 Harkening back to its 1913 decision,125 the
Skeen court reaffirmed that the Education Clause provides an
enforceable constitutional mandate.
[T]he Education Clause not only contains language such
as “shall” but in fact places a “duty” on the legislature to
establish a “general and uniform system” of public schools.
This is the only place in the constitution where the phrase
“it is the duty of the legislature” is used. This, combined
with the sweeping magnitude of the opening sentence of
the Education Clause—”The stability of a republican form
of government depending mainly upon the intelligence of
the people, it is the duty of the legislature to establish a
general and uniform system of public schools”—provides
further support for holding education to be a fundamental
right.126
Notably, the supreme court recognized that Minnesota’s
Education Clause serves the same function in our constitution as the
similar clause in the State of Washington.127 The upshot of the Skeen
decision is that it holds financing to lesser scrutiny under the
Minnesota Constitution.
[W]hile strict scrutiny analysis should be applied in
determining whether the legislature has met a student’s
fundamental right to a general and uniform system of
public schools, a lesser standard, such as a rational basis
test, should apply to the determination of whether the
financing of such a system is “thorough and efficient.”128
And, while Skeen focused on taxation, the court held that the
Education Clause provided a fundamental right to an education,

124. Id. at 313.
125. Associated Sch. of Indep. Dist. No. 63 v. Sch. Dist. No. 83, 122 Minn. 254,
142 N.W. 325 (1913).
126. 505 N.W.2d at 313.
127. Id. (“The conclusion that education is a fundamental right has also been
recognized by other states with similar constitutional provisions. In Seattle Sch. Dist.,
the Washington Supreme Court noted that the statute placed a ‘paramount duty’
on the state to provide ample education. The court noted that this is the ‘declaration
of the State’s social, economic and educational duty as distinguished from a mere
policy or moral obligation,’ and that, ‘[f]lowing from this constitutionally imposed
“duty” is its jural correlative, a correspondent “right” permitting control of another’s
conduct.’”) (citation omitted)).
128. Id. at 315.
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including the right to “what is necessary to provide an adequate level
of education which meets all state standards.”129
Skeen is, in one respect, a central case in understanding
Minnesota’s constitutional Education Clause because it reaffirmed
the constitutional mandate and recognized that the right to
education is fundamental, which includes the constitutional law
implications that follow.130 However, in another respect, Skeen is
nothing but the exclamation point at the end of a sentence
describing Minnesota’s former seat-based education system. State
educational standards were about to change markedly, leading to a
significant change in the financial support and operational and
managerial framework necessary to achieve those standards for
disadvantaged students. This article now turns to Minnesota’s
attempt to radically change the output of its public school system,
without implementing equally radical changes in the framework of
its delivery system.
C.

Minnesota’s Proficiency-Based Standards Legislation

Minnesota’s transition to a proficiency-based education system
followed national recognition that under a seat-based system too
many students were either not graduating from high school or
graduating without basic proficiencies necessary to thrive in a career
or post-secondary education.131 The highest concentration of
students graduating without necessary competencies and
proficiencies fell among certain demographic groups: so-called
“first-generation” students whose families did not have members
with post-secondary education, students in families with low
incomes, students whose native language is not English, African
Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans.132 Yet, these were
demographic groups that were becoming a larger share of
Minnesota’s school-age population.133 Recognizing that the nation
129. Id. at 316.
130. See id. at 313 (holding that education is a fundamental right under the
Minnesota Constitution “not only because of its overall importance to the state but
also because of the explicit language used to describe this constitutional mandate”).
131. See NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, supra note 62, at 30–31.
132. See ASS’N OF MINN. CTYS., supra note 32; MINN. REPORT CARD, supra note 38.
133. Brit C. Henderson & Andi Egbert, Young Adults in Minnesota: A
Demographic & Economic Profile, MINN. STATE DEMOGRAPHIC CTR. 2 (June 2015),
https://mn.gov/admin/assets/young-adults-in-mn-profile-popnotes-june2015_tcm
36-219658.pdf [http://perma.cc/6MNP-327T].
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could not afford to waste the talents of these students, and
prodded by the outcome-based education movement—and the
proficiency-focused federal No Child Left Behind law—the
Minnesota legislature began to radically change the state-mandated
education standards. These standards now form the framework
describing “what is necessary to provide an adequate level of
education which meets all state standards.”134
Under new statutory mandates, the Minnesota Department
of Education was tasked to build a standards-based,
proficiency-producing system and, by rulemaking, determine the
essential proficiencies required for all students.135 The MDE would
require all students—even students not yet having mastered the
ability to read, write, and speak English—to partake in its rigorous
regimen of standardized testing: the Minnesota Comprehensive
Assessments.136 The MDE’s proposed standards would measure all
schools by whether their EL students attained “proficiency,” which is
measured by robust and challenging criterion as established through
an administrative rulemaking process.137 Understanding the role of
these new standards is essential to giving new life to the Education
Clause.

134. Skeen, 505 N.W.2d at 315–16.
135. See MINN. R. 3501.0640–.1345 (2017).
136. Under the most recent version of proficiency tracking when identifying
schools for improvements, former English Learners (EL) will be included in a
school’s EL student group for four years after exiting EL status. MINN. DEP’T OF
EDUC., THE EVERY STUDENT SUCCEEDS ACT (ESSA): ESSA ENGLISH LEARNER
COMMITTEE 4 (2017), http://education.state.mn.us/mdeprod/idcplg?IdcService
=GET_FILE&dDocName=MDE071003&RevisionSelectionMethod=latestReleased&
Rendition=primary [https://perma.cc/EK26-YL8B]. Recently arrived English
Learners will be tested in all subjects during their first year of enrollment, but results
from the state reading test are not used to identify schools for improvement. Id. at
5. Academic progress in reading will be included in the student’s second year of
enrollment, and academic achievement in reading will be included in their third
year of enrollment. Id. See generally STATEWIDE TESTING, MINN. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
http://education.state.mn.us/MDE/fam/tests
[https://perma.cc/F65K-GKJQ]
(last visited Nov. 21, 2017).
137. See generally ACCOUNTABILITY COMMITTEE, MINN. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
http://education.state.mn.us/MDE/dse/ESSA/meet/acc/MDE071208 [https://
perma.cc/K2DQ-LZVJ] (establishing categories of schools which warrant additional
scrutiny for failing to meet EL programming guidelines). None of these standards
were referenced by the parties or the courts in Cruz-Guzman or Forslund, nor were
any cited in the briefs to the Minnesota Supreme Court.
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Once this transformation occurred, under new legislative
education standards, individual classroom teachers simply could not
deliver the state-required level of proficiency to all students without
a marked transformation of the organization of schools.138 Further,
existing legislation substantially impaired such reorganization
efforts.139 Just as production of twenty-first century phones required
a completely different industrial process than the outmoded rotary
dial phone, a complex transformation is required to meet
twenty-first century educational demands.140 The legal and
constitutional implications of this transformation form the basis of
many of the great state court education clause decisions in states
beyond Minnesota.141 Regrettably, the three most recent Minnesota
constitutional challenges have failed to seek the ambitious relief
required to reshape Minnesota’s education system to meet the
legislature’s new and properly ambitious mission.142
Conducting business as usual, Minnesota schools have
successfully educated most socio-economically advantaged students
to the new higher levels imposed by the state legislature, but they
138. See generally The Objective of Education Is Learning, Not Teaching, THE
WHARTON SCH. AT THE U. PA.: KNOWLEDGE @ WHARTON (Aug. 20, 2008),
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/the-objective-of-education-is-learni
ng-not-teaching/ [https://perma.cc/82DM-D79P] [hereinafter Objective of
Education] (providing a transcript of the podcast and describing how a traditional
teacher led education system is a semi-effective mechanism for promoting mass
student understanding but fails when discussing individual, particularized student
learning).
139. See, e.g., Arthur Levine, Better Schools Through Smarter Testing, L.A. TIMES
(Aug. 3, 2012), http://latimes.com/2012/aug/03/opinion/la-oe-levine-schooltesting-20120803 [https://perma.cc/4KQK-5VKV] (identifying how state
mandated, comprehensive testing—that occurs late in the school year—impairs
students from receiving corrective feedback earlier and leads to compounding
detrimental effects for those students, such as student disengagement from the
subject and the learning process as well as the social stigma of being forced to repeat
a grade).
140. See The Objective of Education, supra note 138 (arguing that in a modern,
digitized age, teacher-led environments do not comport with the optimal
capabilities for individualized learning).
141. See McCleary v. State, 173 Wash.2d 477 (Wash. 2012); Conn. Coal. For
Justice in Educ. v. Rell, 295 Conn. 240 (Conn. 2010) (holding that the education
provision of the state constitution guarantees public school students suitable
educational opportunities); Lobato v. State, 218 P.3d 358 (Colo. 2009) (holding
that the adequacy of public school financing system under the state constitution was
justiciable a issue).
142. See infra Part IV.D.
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have utterly failed to meet those norms for students of lower
socio-economic status.143 However, scholarship and practical
experience
have
demonstrated
that
with
appropriate
transformations, public schools can overcome the challenge of
demographics and disadvantage.144
In short, while the Minnesota legislature has appropriately
adjusted statutory education standards to meet today’s imperatives,
the three branches of government have entirely failed to adjust and
deliver an education system that meets the Minnesota legislature’s
purpose of creating a quality education for all students capable of
attaining it.145 Once a state changes to the proficiency-based
paradigm, as both Washington and Minnesota have done, providing
the resources sufficient to achieve those goals requires examination
of the resources required to produce the desired proficiency.146
Minnesota’s legislative process has proven incapable of producing
the required changes necessary to meet state standards. Until
litigation is commenced to trigger such reforms, Minnesota’s
proficiency rates will continue to stagger.

143. See Compl. ¶ 37, Cruz-Guzman v. Minnesota, 27-CV-15-19917, 2015 WL
6774682 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Nov. 5, 2015) (identifying Minneapolis pass rates for
reading at 15 points below the state average, mathematics at 18 points below, and
overall lower than the pass rates for suburban school districts); Compl. ¶ 112,
Forslund v. State, 62-CV-16-2161, 2016 WL 8608311 (Minn. Dist. Ct. May 2, 2016)
(enumerating significant disparity in proficiency rates for urban core schools); see
also supra text accompanying notes 37–44.
144. See Chenoweth & Theokas, supra note 98; see also Odden & Archibald, supra
note 18, at 31–43; DAVID L. KIRP, IMPROBABLE SCHOLARS: THE REBIRTH OF A GREAT
AMERICAN SCHOOL SYSTEM AND A STRATEGY FOR AMERICA’S SCHOOLS 4–12 (2013). See
generally ALAN M. BLANKSTEIN, FAILURE IS NOT AN OPTION: 6 PRINCIPLES THAT ADVANCE
STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT IN HIGHLY EFFECTIVE SCHOOLS (3d ed. 2012); BRYK, supra note
98 (finding five essential elements of school improvement: collaborative teachers,
ambitious instruction, effective leaders, involved families, and a safe and supportive
environment).
145. See infra Part IV.A.
146. See, e.g., THOMAS B. FORDHAM INST., FUND THE CHILD: TACKLING INEQUITY &
ANTIQUITY IN SCHOOL FINANCE 2–32 (2006), http://edex.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.
com/publication/pdfs/FundtheChild062706_7.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8B2QWBTG] (“Although we may wish that achieving this [proficiency] goal was easy for
every student, numerous studies have shown that some students require more resources
than others . . . .” (emphasis added)) [hereinafter FORDHAM INST.].
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IV. CONTINUED CHALLENGES TO MINNESOTA’S EDUCATION SYSTEM
A.

Minnesota’s Dysfunctional Education Budgetary System

The Minnesota Senate’s Fiscal Issue Brief describes Minnesota’s
budgetary process as a “traditional” and “incremental” system of
budgeting.147 It is “[i]ncremental in that the immediately preceding
state budget tends to be the starting point for making future budget
decisions and traditional in the sense that budgets tend to focus on
expenditure controls or inputs (what money buys) rather than
outcomes.”148
In keeping with its traditional and incremental nature, the
governor’s education budget is not based on the cost of delivering
the services and outcomes required by state law.149 In fact, no such
official costing estimate exists. Instead, state-provided revenues are
calculated using complex arrays of funding formulas, such as the
basic formula (basic formula rate times average daily members), and
revenue rates by categories of students, which include compensatory
revenue (rate times number of disadvantaged students) and state
and federal special education revenues.150
Three components contribute to the incremental part of the
biennium’s base budget: (1) adjustments for estimated changes in
the number and category of projected students to be served; (2)
adjustments in the basic formula rate; and (3) adjustments in the
categorical rates.151 Districts serving high rates of students with
economic disadvantages and disabilities, and their representatives,
fight for higher adjustments in the categorical rates.152 Districts
147. See MINN. SENATE OFF. OF COUNSEL, RESEARCH & FISCAL ANALYSIS, MINNESOTA
BUDGET PROCESS REQUIREMENTS 1 (2008).
148. Id.
149. See MINN. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES RESEARCH DEP’T, MINNESOTA SCHOOL
FINANCE: A GUIDE FOR LEGISLATORS (2016) [hereinafter A GUIDE FOR LEGISLATORS].
150. Id. at 2.
151. See generally Greta Kaul, The Legislature is Going to be Debating Education
Funding Again. How, Exactly, Does Minnesota Pay For its Schools?, MINNPOST (Feb. 17,
2017), https://www.minnpost.com/education/2017/02/legislature-going-be-deba
ting-education-funding-again-how-exactly-does-minnesota-p [https://perma.cc/4Z
ED-MWXR] (providing a recent lay person’s description of the components of
school funding).
152. See A GUIDE FOR LEGISLATORS, supra note 149, at 58 (“School districts receive
state aid and some federal aid to pay for special education services. If these funds
are insufficient to pay for the costs of the programs, districts must use other general
fund revenue.”).
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serving lower rates of those students tend to fight for allocating all
or most of the incremental funding based on the basic formula.153
These adjustments are not calculated based on cost of services.154
The governor’s proposal is derived by working backwards from the
total amount of new revenue he or she is willing to allocate to public
education, and his or her policy preferences as to how much new
revenue should be placed in the basic formula versus categorical
funding (e.g., compensatory revenue and special education).155
During a divided government, Democrats and Republicans play a
game of chicken; the Democrats demand higher increments and
Republicans demand lower, until the deadlock is finally broken at
the last minute.156
Still, no process exists to link the budgetary submission to the
estimated cost of delivering the programs and outcomes mandated
by state and federal law. When the budget arrives at the legislature,
legislators have no data-based estimate of the funding gap inherent
in the governor’s proposed budget between cost of mandated
programs and the proposed budget targets. This author testified to
153. See Kaul, supra note 151 (explaining that basic education funding may cover
up to eighty percent of a district’s total cost while the remaining costs vary
depending on a district’s characteristics and its student population).
154. See id.
155. In the 2007 legislative session, Democrats, controlling the legislative
branch, complained that the special education cross subsidy had increased by
hundreds of millions of dollars during the Pawlenty administration and proposed a
major increase in the special education formula to redress that problem. See Laura
McCallum, Senate Focuses Attention of Special Education as it Passes “Lean” Bill, MINN.
PUB. RADIO (Mar. 26, 2007), https://www.mprnews.org/story/2007/03/26/ed
[https://perma.cc/S3AH-9C4Q]. Governor Pawlenty withheld his support, seeking
to reprogram that money onto the basic formula. Democrats in the senate refused
to allow this transfer, and eventually the branches compromised on a significantly
lower basic formula increase to accompany the special education relief. See
Governor Tim Pawlenty, Statement of Line Item Veto, May 30, 2007,
https://www.leg.state.mn.us/archive/vetoes/2007veto_ch146.pdf [https://perma.
cc/9WMX-ETEG] (“This K-12 education bill failed to provide the level of general
formula funding I proposed.”). In following years, the legislature gradually took
back much of the special education relief to fund formula increases. ASS’N OF
METRO. SCH. DISTS., POSITION ON SPECIAL EDUCATION 1–2 (2013),
http://www.amsd.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/2015-AMSD-SpecialEducation-Position-Paper.pdf. [https://perma.cc/66U8-MABS].
156. See Governor Mark Dayton, Veto Letter (May 12, 2017),
http://mn.gov/gov-stat/pdf/2017_05_12_Letter_Ch_43_Veto.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/BQN6-D98U] (vetoing omnibus E-12 education appropriations bill and
detailing the lack of agreement regarding spending amounts).
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the Senate Finance Committee in 2007, and many committee
members professed amazement at the magnitude of the discrepancy
between special education costs and revenues, and many wrongly
attributed that gap to shortfalls in the federal share of funding.
Independent of this budgeting process, stakeholders and
advocacy groups encourage legislators to initiate new programs, or
enhance old ones, in ways that make significant new claims on
existing resources.157 These policy initiatives are developed
independently of their impacts on local district costs and generally
do not factor into overall budget levels.158
In recent years, for example, two such major initiatives were
passed which, if faithfully implemented by local districts, would make
major unfunded claims on already insufficient funds.159 The
Minnesota LEAPS Act160 demands major reforms in the delivery of
services to the over 65,000 EL students.161 A study by the Association

157. See, e.g., STAKEHOLDERS ADVISORY GROUP, MINN. EDUC. EQUITY P’SHIP (last
visited Dec. 1, 2017), https://mneep.org/el-stakeholders-advisory-group/
[https://perma.cc/GYZ2-2ZA5] (demonstrating how new EL programs could cause
financial strain on existing programs).
158. See id.
159. See
generally
LEAPS
ACT,
MINN.
DEP’T
OF
EDUC.,
http://education.state.mn.us/MDE/dse/el/leap/
[https://perma.cc/E8BW4Q8M] (last visited Dec. 1, 2017) (“The Learning English for Academic Proficiency
and Success (LEAPS) Act was passed in Minnesota in 2014. The law revises many
state statutes to add an increased emphasis to support English Learners. The law is
embedded into many existing statutes, including early childhood, curriculum and
instruction, higher education, adult education, and teacher licensing.”).
160. MINN. STAT. §§ 124D.58–.64, 124D.65, subdiv. 6 (2017); Conor P. Williams
& Colleen G. Ebinger, The Learning for English Academic Proficiency and Success Act:
Ensuring Faithful and Timely Implementation, MCKNIGHT FOUND. 4 (Oct. 2014)
(“During the 2014 legislative session, lawmakers passed the nation’s most
comprehensive legislation in support of English Learners (ELs). The law has three
principal goals for all EL students: a) academic English proficiency, b) grade-level
content knowledge, and c) multilingual skills development. Chief among the
mandates is the requirement that all teachers be skilled in teaching ELs. Delivering
these goals will require action at every level of the educational system: state agencies
and the Board of Teaching, teacher preparation programs at institutions of higher
education, school districts and charter schools, and classroom teachers and school
staff.”).
161. Williams & Ebinger, supra note 160, at 4. The largest EL populations
include Latino, Somali and Hmong students. Id. The total number of EL students
increased by 300 percent in the past 20 years, making ELs the fastest growing part
of Minnesota’s student population. Id. But, “nearly half of EL students do not
graduate from high school . . . .” Id.

2018]

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

711

of Metropolitan School Districts estimated the operating deficit for
existing EL programs before LEAPS at about ninety-five million
dollars per year, with the shortfalls unequally distributed to districts
with high EL populations.162 A year later, in 2015, the legislature
passed legislation requiring dyslexia services.163 The legislature and
Department of Education have utterly failed to budget for these
costs,164 yet the target population is likely more than ten percent of
the student population.165 Importantly, within this target population
are students who can radically improve their performance if they
receive proper services.166

162. MINN. DEP’T OF EDUC., ENGLISH LEARNER CROSS-SUBSIDY FY 2016 (Feb.
2017),
http://www.amsd.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/AMSD-EL-CrossSubsidy-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/46MS-4RTW].
163. MINN. STAT. § 120B.12, subdiv. 2 (2017) (“Each school district shall identify
before the end of kindergarten, grade 1, and grade 2 students who are not reading
at grade level before the end of the current school year . . . . The district also must
annually report to the commissioner by July 1 a summary of the district’s efforts to
screen and identify students with dyslexia [or] convergence insufficiency disorder;
(b) A student identified under this subdivision must be provided with alternate
instruction under section 125A.56, subdivision 1.”).
164. These costs will likely include identifying and training staff to conduct
screening and verify diagnoses, and then implementing curriculum designed for
students with dyslexia. See generally SALLY SHAYWITZ, OVERCOMING DYSLEXIA: A NEW
AND COMPLETE SCIENCE-BASED PROGRAM FOR READING PROBLEMS AT ANY LEVEL (Alfred
A. Knopf ed., 1st ed. 2003). In Minnesota, Groves Academy provides a charter-based
program for students with dyslexia. Its reading program relies on the Wilson
Reading System, an Orton-Gillingham based approach to reading designed for
classroom instruction. Many other students receive Orton-Gillingham based
instruction from individual tutors. Tutoring—Developing Skills for Academic Success,
GROVES ACADEMY, https://www.grovesacademy.org/learning-center/tutoring/ [htt
ps://perma.cc/TD73-ELF8] (last visited Nov. 28, 2017).
165. Chris H. Johnson, The Impact of Dyslexia in Rural Minnesota Communities,
COLL. ST. SCHOLASTICA (May 8, 2017), https://search.proquest.com/openview/46
ede643bcd31ba3ff02320d9f3314e4/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=18750&diss=y [htt
ps://perma.cc/7QZK-64C5]; see The State of LD: Understanding the 1 in 5, NAT’L CTR.
FOR LEARNING DISABILITIES, https://www.ncld.org/archives/blog/the-state-of-ldunderstanding-the-1-in-5 [https://perma.cc/EZ7L-8V6M] (last visited Dec. 15,
2017) (“One in five children in the U.S. have learning and attention issues such as
dyslexia and ADHD . . . .”).
166. The State of LD, supra note 165 (“Children with learning and attention issues
are as smart as their peers and with the right support can achieve at high levels, but
a lack of early or effective interventions leads too many kids on a downward spiral.”
(quoting Mimi Corcoran, President and CEO of the National Center for Learning
Disabilities)).
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Collective bargaining further complicates Minnesota’s school
finance system.167 There is absolutely no guarantee that increased
funding—even if historically large—will translate into improved
programs for disadvantaged students.168 Collective bargaining
commences in the biennial budget year.169 The political and
economic power granted to teachers unions170 in Minnesota often
drives boards and superintendents to allocate virtually all additional
funds, unless categorically dedicated, to increased employee
compensation and benefits.171 This results in a series of budget
167. See MINN. STAT. §§ 179A.01–.25 (2017) (establishing the Public
Employment Labor Relations Act (PELRA) and state collective bargaining laws that
govern Minnesota public employers and representatives of unionized public
employees). Under PELRA, public employers and representatives of public
employees must negotiate terms and conditions of employment. Negotiated terms
and conditions include hours of employment, fringe benefits, and personnel
policies affecting employee working conditions. While most retirement benefits are
not negotiable, school districts may negotiate contributions to premiums for group
insurance coverage of retired employees and severance pay provisions.
168. See Benjamin A. Lindy, The Impact of Teacher Collective Bargaining Laws on
Student Achievement: Evidence from a New Mexico Natural Experiment, 120 YALE L.J. 1130,
1177 (explaining how a study done of collective bargaining’s effects on student
achievement in New Mexico found that “under mandatory collective bargaining,
any improvement in student achievement comes at the expense of poor-performing
students”).
169. Lisa Larson, School District Collective Bargaining, HOUSE RESEARCH (2011),
http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/ss/sscollbarg.pdf [https://perma.
cc/9HPF-TKX3].
170. See Joshua Cowen & Katharine O. Strunk, How do Teachers’ Unions Influence
Education Policy? What We Know and What We Need to Learn 5–8 (The Educ. Pol’y Ctr.
at Mich. St. U., Working Paper No. 42, 2014). “Nearly every aspect of teachers’ work
and school operations is negotiated into teachers’ union contracts, leading one
scholar to note that union contracts are the most important policy document
governing school district operations.” Id. at 5–6. Several studies have found that
collective bargaining agreements inhibit administrators’ ability to operate. See id. at
7–8.
171. In both Minneapolis and St. Paul, teachers’ unions have historically
dominated school board elections through the DFL endorsements. One indication
of labor’s power in collective bargaining is the magnitude of future unfunded
benefits granted in agreements with licensed union employees. By way of example,
as of 2008, the St. Paul District had granted its licensed employees future unfunded
post-retirement benefits (OPEB) with a present value of $312 million ($8,000 per
pupil), about 55% of its operating revenue. OFF. OF STATE AUDITOR, SPECIAL STUDY
OTHER POST EMPLOYMENT BENEFIT LIABILITIES OF SCHOOL DISTRICTS IN MINNESOTA 3
(Mar. 31, 2009). Some Iron Range school districts have granted OPEB benefits
equal to, or even double, annual operating revenues. Id. These are examples of
concessions improvidently made in bargaining, to find a way to meet labor’s
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increases and cuts that shift the focus away from student
achievement.
This cycle of revenue increases—followed by cuts and pleas for
further increases—can cause appropriators to believe that when they
increase the budget, they are not buying improved programs but
instead funding compensation increases and restoring some of the
prior biennium’s catastrophic cuts.172 Financial equilibrium is not
struck around school transformation and meeting state educational
proficiency goals, but instead on buying labor peace and keeping
districts out of statutory operating deficit.173
If Minnesota is to meet the constitutional goal of providing an
education that prepares economically disadvantaged students for
twenty-first century careers, it needs to reorganize and reform the
process by which the legislature makes “such provisions . . . as will
secure a thorough and efficient system of public schools throughout
the state.”174 To this end this article turns next to a case with
constitutional lessons for Minnesota, McCleary v. State. 175
B.

Financing Adequacy: Lessons from McCleary

As the movement for new state proficiency standards gained
steam, proponents began to raise concerns as to whether existing
state financial support was adequate to meet the new standards.176
The National Conference of State Legislatures urged its member

demands outside currently available funds.
172. See, e.g., Christopher Magan, Minnesota Schools are Getting $483M in
New Funding. Why Are So Many Still Tightening Belts?, PIONEER PRESS (June 17, 2017,
7:00 AM), http://www.twincities.com/2017/06/17/new-money-from-capitol-butminnesota-schools-still-cant-meet-their-budgets/ [https://perma.cc/VT4L-H37Z]
(surmising whether teacher pay is the problem for Minnesota school district budget
issues).
173. See id. (“[T]he Center for Fiscal Excellence found the state would need to
increase per-pupil funding by roughly 4 percent a year to keep pace with growing
costs [of teacher compensation] . . . . [T]he group recommends overhauling the
pay structure to focus more on student outcomes and teacher performance.”).
174. MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1.
175. 269 P.3d 227, 251–52 (Wash. 2014).
176. See, e.g., Kathy Checkley, Money Matters: A Primer on K-12 School Funding, CTR.
FOR PUB. EDUC. (July 2, 2008), http://www.centerforpubliceducation.org/MainMenu/Policies/Money-matters-At-a-glance/Money-matters-A-primer-on-K12-schoo
l-funding.html [https://perma.cc/Z7AP-V4V5] (noting the rise in state adequacy
lawsuits against state-level funding agencies following the increase in standardsbased reform legislation).
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legislatures to set clear and measurable educational goals or
objectives expected of students as the basis for an adequate school
finance system.
[S]tate policymakers and courts should apply the test of
“adequacy” as a primary criterion in examining the
effectiveness of any existing or proposed school finance
system . . . [and e]nsure that sufficient funding is provided
to establish and maintain the identified capacity that is
essential for schools to provide every student a reasonable
opportunity to achieve expected educational goals or
objectives.177
To his credit, Governor Pawlenty recognized at the beginning
of his first term that delivering proficiency to all students required a
different school finance system.178 He appointed a commission to
make recommendations on how to respond to the emerging
education crisis and to determine the funding required to
accomplish new state education standards.179 The Commission’s
mission was “to examine and make recommendations to revamp
Minnesota’s K-12 education finance system.”180
The Commission’s initial report recognized the growing
educational challenges181 and the failure of Minnesota’s finance
177. TERRY N. WHITNEY, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, EDUCATIONAL
ADEQUACY: BUILDING AN ADEQUATE SCHOOL FINANCE SYSTEM 3 (1998).
178. Tim Pugmire, Task Force Recommends New School Funding System MINN. PUB.
RADIO (Mar. 15, 2004), http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/
2004/03/16_pugmiret_edfunding/ [https://perma.cc/UXA4-UAKR] (detailing
Governor Pawlenty’s task force on education finance reform).
179. See Information on Minnesota State Agencies, Boards, Task Forces, and
Commissions, MINNESOTA LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE LIBRARY, https://www.leg.
state.mn.us/lrl/agencies/agencies_detail?AgencyID=1757 [https: //perma.cc/
SG7N-JFBG] (last visited Nov. 22, 2017); Ric Dressen et al., Investing in Our Future,
SCHOOL FUNDING TASK FORCE (July 2004), https://www.leg.state.mn.
us/docs/2004/other/040378.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 9N5R-NAWB] [hereinafter
Investing in Our Future].
180. Investing in Our Future, supra note 179, at 2.
181. “The Commission found that evolving conditions included:
•
Achievement disparities occurring among our student ethnic
populations,
•
Limited English Proficient students are increasing in our
schools,
•
Student mobility from one school to another is creating greater
educational demands,
•
Students from families of poverty are increasing in our schools,
•
Greater Minnesota’s student population is in a steady decline,
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system to correlate revenues to the cost of achieving adequacy.182
The Commission challenged the legislature to respond to the
changing societal and demographic conditions impacting schools
and school funding. To that end, it urged that “Minnesota’s 21st
century educational funding formula should be a rationally
determined, learning-linked, student-oriented, and cost-based
Instructional Services Allocation.”183
The Commission initiated a preliminary review to provide an
estimate of the new funding under such a system.184 However, there
were concerns that continuation of these efforts might support a
conclusion that Minnesota education was being underfunded by six
to fourteen percent.185 This drew the ire of the Governor, who
cancelled the Commission’s costing efforts.186 In response, the
Association of Metropolitan School Districts, the Minnesota Rural
Education Association, and the Schools for Equity in Education
retained the Augenblick firm to continue the Commission’s

•
•
•

Minnesota’s population is getting older and living longer,
Minnesota’s tax revenue, which supports public services, is
slowing, [and]
Limitations in the current education funding formula,
including its lack of understandability and limited link to
student and school performance.”

Id. at 5.
182. Pugmire, supra note 178 (“The [commission] is recommending a funding
formula based on the actual cost of providing a student with an education sufficient
to meet state standards.”).
183. Investing in Our Future, supra note 179, at 24.
The dollar value of an “Instructional Services Allocation” (ISA) should
be: (1) Cost-based by translating the abstract costs into actual school and
district operating costs. (2) Funded on an individual student basis. (3)
Tailored to relevant characteristics of each individual student. “Relevant
characteristics” means a student’s grade level and incorporates, where
appropriate, extraordinary conditions such as: student disabilities,
household or neighborhood poverty, pre-K or Kindergarten readiness,
English language learners, [or] high incidence of school-to-school
mobility.
Id. at 25.
184. Id. at 24.
185. See MEYERS ET AL., supra note 14, at 9.
186. See John Fitzgerald, April 25: The Day School Quality Died, EDUC. POL’Y REV.
(Apr. 30, 2008), http://www.mn2020.org/issues-that-matter/education/april-25the-day-school-quality-died [https://perma.cc/ P422-27VP]; see also MEYERS ET AL.,
supra note 14, at 1.
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preliminary work.187 Augenblick’s preliminary report confirmed the
one billion dollar estimated funding shortfall and urged Minnesota
to undertake a full costing study to fulfill the recommendation of a
learning-linked school finance system.188 The Augenblick report
stated:
From the beginning of the standards-based reform
movement in this country (starting with the reform of the
Kentucky education system in 1990), most states and the
federal government have not attempted to estimate the
costs that every school or district would incur to help each
of their students meet state/federal performance
standards. Determining these costs has become an essential
missing piece that state policymakers need in order to
understand what resources schools require to enable each
student to succeed. In addition, once these costs are
determined, state policymakers also need to properly
address them in the state’s school finance system.189
In the Skeen decision, the Minnesota Supreme Court referenced
the State of Washington’s approach to the role of the judiciary under
its Education Clause.190 Washington, like Minnesota, had
transformed to a proficiency-based education system.191
Additionally, like Minnesota, neither the governor nor legislature
had attempted to rationally link the funding of public education to
the new legislative education standards.192 In McCleary, a statewide
coalition of community groups, public school districts, and
education organizations alleged that although the legislature had
radically changed the elements of the legislatively required
education, it had failed to adjust state funding to achieve that
objective.193 Unlike the Forslund and Cruz-Guzman cases, the McCleary
187. MEYERS ET AL., supra note 14, at 1.
188. Id. at 9–10.
189. Id. at 2. Governor Dayton, after facing from the education community to
restart the Pawlenty Commission’s work, established the Education Finance
Working Group. See MINN. DEP’T OF EDUC., FUNDING EDUCATION FOR THE FUTURE 1
(May 2011), http://www.amsd.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/EFReport-2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V244-HH7Z]. Governor Dayton insisted that the Working
Group limit its efforts to recommending ways to reallocate existing resources and
prohibited the Working Group from estimating the shortfall in funding. Id.
190. Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 313 (Minn. 1993).
191. McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227, 234 (Wash. 2012).
192. Id. at 234–36.
193. Id. at 235 (Wash. 2012); see Seattle School District No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d
71 (Wash. 1975) (holding that the Washington constitution imposed a judicially
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lawyers represented school districts and school organizations with
the experience and expertise necessary to advance a claim for relief
that might offer the massive fiscal relief school districts needed.194
Applying the principles of McCleary is an important element in
any effort to reinvigorate the Education Clause in Minnesota.
Minnesota and Washington have faced challenges with striking
parallels—both states have transitioned from a seat-based (or
teaching-based) education system to a proficiency-based system.195
Like Minnesota, Washington failed to adjust its funding to correlate
with the demands of a new state educational paradigm, despite
reports from officially established commissions.196 McCleary held that
the state does not meet its constitutional obligation to public
education if its funding formulas do not correlate to the level or
resources needed to meet the state’s educational standards.197 This
holding, if adopted in Minnesota, would strike down the incremental
and traditional education funding system. Such a holding would not
be an attack on the legislature’s powers. On the contrary, it would
empower the legislature by providing the data necessary to fulfill its
duty to provide adequate education to Minnesotans. Moreover, this
holding would provide a data-driven basis for budgeting. Providing
the legislature with the true cost of achieving Minnesota’s education
standards, which are set by the legislature itself, would vindicate the
principles articulated by the National Conference of State
Legislatures, promote sound legislative decision-making, and
comport with plain common sense.198
McCleary agreed with the trial court’s finding that the cost of
delivering students to a preset level of proficiency must necessarily
be significantly greater than the cost of simply putting them in
classrooms and hoping that they take advantage of the standard
enforceable affirmative duty on the state to make ample provision for the education
of all children residing within its borders).
194. See McCleary, 269 P.3d at 227.
195. See id. at 234–35.
196. See id. at 235–36.
197. Id. at 254.
198. See State Role in Education Finance, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF ST. LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/state-role-in-education-finance.aspx [htt
ps://perma.cc/3Y8E-UPJ8] (last visited Dec. 1, 2017) (“A sound state school
finance system . . . [p]rovides adequate resources to local school districts so that
they may achieve state and local educational goals and standards.”). See generally
MEYERS ET AL., supra note 14 (recommending several methodologies for
determining educational funding).
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curriculum delivered by the teacher.199 As McCleary recognized, the
cost of achieving a designated proficiency level must rise significantly
because schools must address the needs of students who would
otherwise be left behind in the old paradigm.200 A student who is two
years behind in third grade simply cannot catch up in the same
amount of time or with the same pedagogical resources as a student
who is at, or above, his or her grade level.201
Unfortunately, in Minnesota, and many other states, legislatures
generally focus not on the cost of the newly specified educational
result, but rather on how much money has historically been provided
to public education.202 From there, the legislatures then adjust the
level of funding based on existing revenues, tax policy, and the
political philosophy of the legislators, rather than on what is needed
to meet the new standards.203 The need to correlate revenues with
the true cost of providing services is further magnified when it arises
in the context of the billion-dollar biennial deficit in special
education funding.204
When revenues are not learning-linked, as recommended by the
Pawlenty Education Finance Reform Task Force, districts serving
high percentages of students with disabilities or economic
disadvantages must cannibalize programs delivered to low-cost
advantaged students, or skimp on programs serving disadvantaged

199. McCleary, 269 P.3d at 252–58 (finding that the legislature failed to change
its educational funding mechanism to meet the new standards it created in
transitioning from a seat-based to a performance-based education system).
200. See id. at 257–58.
201. THE WALLACE FOUND., REIMAGINING THE SCHOOL DAY: MORE TIME FOR
LEARNING 7–8 (2011), http://www.wallacefoundation.org/knowledge-center/
Documents/Reimagining-the-School-Day-More-Time-for-Learning.pdf [https://
perma.cc/J2QK-FYTM].
202. See generally MINN. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FISCAL ANALYSIS DEP’T,
FINANCING
EDUCATION
IN
MINNESOTA
2016-2017
(Aug.
2016),
https://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/fiscal/files/16fined.pdf
[http://perma.cc/
36Y9-KSA2] [hereinafter FINANCING EDUCATION] (describing the method of
financing education in Minnesota).
203. See id.; Tim Pugmire, GOP Lawmakers Question Need for School District Levies,
MINN. PUB. RADIO (Sept. 12, 2011), https://www.mprnews.org/story/2011/09/12/
republican-lawmakers-school-levies [https://perma.cc/TJ9S-WCDT]; Kaul, supra
note 151.
204. MINN. OFF. OF THE LEGIS. AUDITOR, EVALUATION REP.: SPECIAL EDUC. 49
(March 2013), http://www.auditor.leg.state.mn.us/ped/pedrep/sped.pdf [https:
// perma.cc/T6P2-H3CH].

2018]

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

719

students.205 When a district is forced to “cross subsidize” these
additional programs, it places the district at a competitive
disadvantage compared to neighboring school districts with lower
special cross subsidies.206 Minnesota’s school system, open
enrollment options, and charter system create an unstable
environment. This system encourages the migration of low-cost
advantaged students out of schools and school districts that serve
high-cost disadvantaged students.207 This contributes to a downward
financial spiral because advantaged students migrate to neighboring
school districts with superior fiscal circumstances. In some districts,
this migration also contributes to the development of charter school
competition.208 Ironically, this irrational fiscal system accelerates
racial and economic isolation in schools. Yet in Cruz-Guzman, the
plaintiffs conspicuously avoided addressing the financial issues faced
by urban school districts.209 Such financial issues are major
contributors to concentrations of poverty.210
In McCleary, the Washington Supreme Court pointed out that
the state of Washington completed a study by nationally recognized
experts Lawrence O. Picus and Allan R. Odden. 211 The results of this
205. See Investing in Our Future, supra note 179, at 8.
206. See id.
207. See Julian V. Heilig et al., Separate and Unequal? The Problematic Segregation of
Special Populations in Charter Schools Relative to Traditional Public Schools, 27 STAN. L. &
POL’Y REV. 251, 269 (2016), http://www.academia.edu/33623412/Vasquez_Heilig_
J._Holme_J._LeClair_A._V._Redd_L._and_Ward_D._2016_._Separate_and_unequ
al_The_problematic_segregation_of_special_populations_in_charter_schools_rela
tive_to_traditional_public_schools._Stanford_Law_and_Policy_Review_27_2_251293 [https://perma.cc/X7P3-2EGU]; Eang L. Ngov, Following Fisher: Narrowly
Tailoring Affirmative Action, 64 CATH. UNIV. L. REV. 1 n.139 (2014),
http://scholarship.law.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3299&context=lawreview
[https://perma.cc/776Z-73E5] (“[Professor Orenthlicher] projects that parents
might move their children to less rigorous schools to provide their children a
competitive edge, and in doing so, schools in disadvantaged neighborhoods might
benefit financially and politically from the migration of wealthier students.”).
208. Michael M. Amir et al., Charter Fights: The Competing Rights of Charter Schools
and Local School Districts Are Triggering Myriad Legal Disputes, 31 L.A. LAWYER 24, 27
(2008), https://www.lacba.org/docs/default-source/lal-back-issues/2008. . ./july
august-2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y237-VKV3] (“While this funding system can
promote competition among charter and traditional school districts to attract
students and teachers, it can also create a tension between the two groups.”).
209. Myron Orfield, Why Are the Twin Cities So Segregated?, 43 MITCHELL HAMLINE
L. REV. 1, 8 (2017).
210. Id.
211. McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227, 240 (Wash. 2012).
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study estimated that Washington schools were underfunded by
about two billion dollars.212 This figure is nearly identical to the
results of a similar study which was abandoned in Minnesota.213 The
Washington Supreme Court’s opinion details at length other studies
and reports showing that the funding system in Washington did not
rationally connect to the state legislature’s package of basic
educational programs.214 The court explained:
“[T]he funding model for K-12 education has not been
updated to reflect the new expectations and has not
addressed the question of how to use resources most
effectively in order to improve student outcomes.”
Tellingly, the report concluded that “[s]table and
significantly increased funding is required to support the
evolving needs of our education system.”215
The court also found that the state could not meet its obligation
without connecting actual cost to actual revenues:
The evidence at trial showed that the State’s
now-abandoned basic education funding formulas did not
correlate to the real cost of amply providing students with
the constitutionally required “education.” As a result, the
State has consistently failed to provide adequate funding
for the program of basic education, including funding for
essential operational costs such as utilities and
transportation. To fill this gap in funding, local districts
have been forced to turn increasingly to excess levies,
placing them on . . . [an] unstable financial foundation
. . . . The basic education funding formulas examined by
the trial court did not correlate to the level of resources
needed to provide all students with an opportunity to meet
the State’s education standards. This disconnect had its
genesis in the legislature’s failure to update the funding
formulas after the state transitioned from a seat-based
education system to a performance-based system in 1992.
The legislature continued to fund schools using the
formulas adopted in the Basic Education Act—formulas
that were based on a snapshot of actual staffing levels and
school district expenditures in the mid-1970s, not the level
212. Id. at 241.
213. See MEYERS ET AL, supra note 14 (identifying a shortfall of almost one million
dollars per year, or two million on a biennial basis).
214. McCleary, 269 P.3d at 253–58.
215. Id. at 253–54 (quoting the Washington Learns final report (citations
omitted)).
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of resources needed to allow students to meet the new
performance-based standards. . . . Because the state’s
funding formulas did not correlate to the actual cost of
maintaining its basic education program, state funding for
“basic education” consistently fell below the mark.216
McCleary held that the legislature does not do its job if it ignores the
true cost of providing mandated services.217 Accordingly, the
Washington Supreme Court found that the legislature has a duty to
“correlate” the resources provided to schools with the actual cost of
state mandates for “basic education.”218
This shortage in funding is so transparent and so clearly a major
contributing factor to Minnesota’s failure to achieve legislatively
established academic standards that it is strange that neither the
Forslund nor the Cruz-Guzman plaintiffs alleged funding as a
substantial contributing factor causing the achievement gap.219 A
constitutional suit must seek relief that addresses systemic problems.
Otherwise, the claim fails because it does not require economically
disadvantaged students to meet state education standards.220
C.

Challenging Non-Financial Components of the System

Part I noted the necessity of making major changes in the
organization of schools, particularly the way teachers and
administrators collaborate to deliver instruction.221 Merely adding
two billion dollars to the existing system, without corresponding
changes in how Minnesota operates and organizes schools, would
only produce a more costly system that continues to fail
disadvantaged students.222 Odden and Picus, two leading experts in
school reform, warn that there are deeply embedded systemic forces
216. Id.
217. Id. at 257.
218. Id. at 253.
219. Compl. ¶ 112, Forslund v. State, 62-CV-16-2161, 2016 WL 8608311 (Minn.
Dist. Ct. May 2, 2016); Compl. ¶ 37, Cruz-Guzman v. Minnesota, 27-CV-15-19917,
2015 WL 6774682 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Nov. 5, 2015).
220. Cf. Vergara v. State, 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d 532 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016) (describing
the court’s examination of a statute in question that affects similar groups in an
unequal manner).
221. See supra Part I.
222. See MEYERS ET AL., supra note 14, at 2–3 (explaining that schools lack the
“resources to meet state and federally mandated accountability for provisions for
student achievement,” especially those students “who live in poverty and who may
also experience language barriers”).
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that impair the allocation of new resources, even when provided, to
fund appropriate strategies:
[F]rom assessing the education system’s use of new
resources over time, Odden and Picus (2008) concluded
that the education system has used the bulk of new
resources for programs outside the core instructional
program—not the best strategy if the goal is to dramatically
improve student performance in core subjects.223
There are also deeply embedded systemic forces that resist the
changes in the delivery system. A necessary adjunct of adequate state
funding is a system to ensure that state funding buys staff the services
and additional learning and preparation time necessary to achieve
state goals.224 There have been modest efforts to recognize the need
for reform embedded in a voluntary legislative program: the
Minnesota Quality Compensation program (Q Comp).225 That
program is based on modern best practices research that
substantiates the position taken here: that both funding and systemic
reform are essential components in meeting state established
goals.226 In 2005, both legislative caucuses and the Pawlenty
administration created a program that would transform pilot schools
into professional learning communities, and significantly change the
223. Odden & Archibald, supra note 18, at page x. As this article is written,
Minnesota school districts across the state are settling their labor contracts to
provide compensation increases that vastly outweigh increased revenues provided
by the legislature. See Magan, supra note 172. This in turn will trigger cuts in the
programs most directly associated with achievement improvements of
disadvantaged students. See id.
224. See generally QUALITY COMPENSATION: SUPPORTING AND REWARDING
EXCELLENCE IN TEACHING, EDUCATORS FOR EXCELLENCE 12 (Aug. 2014),
[https://
https://e4e.org/what-we-do/policy-solutions/quality-compensation
perma.cc/RHT2-25JA] (recommending four components of a state funding system
including a career ladder, professional development, teacher evaluations, and
performance pay).
225. See Q COMP REQUIREMENTS AND GUIDING PRINCIPLES, MINN. DEP’T OF
EDUC. (2017–18), https://education.state.mn.us/mdeprod/idcplg?IdcService
=GET_FILE&dDocName=054793&RevisionSelectionMethod=latestReleased&Ren
dition
=primary
[https://perma.cc/HXJ3-FNPY];
Q
COMP:
QUALITY
COMPENSATION FOR TEACHERS, OFF. LEGIS. AUDITOR 1, 7 (Feb. 2009),
http://www.auditor.leg.state.mn.us/ped/pedrep/qcomp.pdf [https://perma.cc/
ZR9B-RGN8] [hereinafter OFFICE LEGIS. AUDITOR].
226. See OFF. LEGIS. AUDITOR, supra note 225, at 3–4 (describing Q Comp as using
“pedagogical best practices” and involving reform efforts on the training and
evaluation of teachers as well as “the use of financial incentives to improve teacher
performance”).
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structure of the teaching profession in those schools.227 A further
element of Q Comp was that the teaching profession did not make
adequate provision for instructional leadership, which was based
upon the conviction of both Governor Pawlenty and his Education
Commissioner Seagren.228
Specifically, the traditional step-and-lane system, which makes
no provision for leadership positions including master teachers or
subject matter experts, results in a few leadership positions
compared to the total number of teacher and staff positions.229 The
227. See id. at 3 (“A wave of research in the 1990s suggested that professional
development activities were most effective when they addressed how students learn,
focused on instructional practices specifically related to the curriculum, drew upon
multiple sources of information and data, and involved collaborative work by
teachers. One influential innovation was the use of ‘professional learning
communities,’ in which groups of teachers worked together to educate themselves
about pedagogical best practices.”). See generally RICHARD DUFOUR & ROBERT EAKER,
PROFESSIONAL LEARNING COMMUNITIES AT WORK: BEST PRACTICES FOR ENHANCING
STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT (1998); Louise Stoll et al., Professional Learning Communities:
A Review of the Literature, 7 J. EDUC. CHANGE 221, 230 (2006) (discussing a study that
concluded “collaborative continuing professional development (CPD) and its effect
on teaching and learning . . . could have a positive impact on teachers and pupils”).
228. See OFF. LEGIS. AUDITOR, supra note 225, at 2–3. Even with Q Comp in place,
one common concern that this author frequently hears from his peers is that there
are few leadership opportunities for teachers to expand their impact without leaving
the classroom. In fact, research shows that one of the main reasons successful
teachers leave the profession is because of a lack of meaningful opportunities for
career advancement. See Where Have All the Teachers Gone?, LEARNING POL’Y INST.
(Aug. 16, 2017), https://learningpolicyinstitute.org/press-release/where-have-allteachers-gone [https://perma.cc/RC6U-2D8Y] (noting that lack of advancement
opportunities was among the most cited reasons for teacher departures).
Traditional career pathways like the ones supported by Q Comp plans are a good
start, but too often they are just supplementary responsibilities that need to be
completed as opposed to embedded leadership roles that require teachers to
develop new professional skills. See QUALITY COMPENSATION, supra note 224
(discussing how roles of teachers could be more flexible and differentiated to meet
the unique needs of individual school settings, instead of standard roles for the
whole district).
229. See generally James W. Guthrie, School Finance: Fifty Years of Expansion, 7
FUTURE CHILD. 24 (1997), https://slideblast.com/school-finance-fifity-years-ofexpansion-princeton-university_594179af1723ddea237aee57.html [https://perma.
cc/GR55-8UTT] (“Compared with other large enterprises, a relatively small
number of school administrators supervise a large number of staff members. An
association of school administrators analyzed data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics and concluded that elementary and secondary schools employ 14.5
persons per executive, administrator, or manager, compared with 9.3 in the
transportation industry, 8.4 in food products, 7.1 in manufacturing, 6.3 in
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traditional organization of the teaching profession might be
compared to a battalion staffed only by a single lieutenant colonel,
no captains, lieutenants or sergeants—that is, a complete absence of
intermediate leadership and expertise. To remedy this problem, the
Q Comp program expanded career advancement opportunities,
required the participating districts to purchase desperately needed
time for professional development,230 data evaluation, collaboration
amongst teachers and other professionals, and implemented of a
rigorous intentional and structured curriculum.231 However, in
Minnesota, as a practical matter, management needs the consent of
its labor union to make many of these reforms.232 Minnesota has a
system of education in which a public school district, charged with
meeting a constitutional responsibility and fulfilling a statutory
mandate, must obtain the consent of a majority of its teaching force
to approve the Q Comp reforms.233
construction, 5.4 in mining, and 3.6 in public administration.”).
230. See Darling-Hammond, supra note 18, at 14. The highest-achieving
countries on international measures such as Programme for International Student
Assessment (PISA) and Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study
(TIMSS) have been particularly intent on developing teachers’ expertise both
before they enter the profession and throughout their careers. Id. “[Their teacher
development practices] stand in stark contrast to those in the United States where,
with sparse and fragmented governmental support, teachers typically enter:
•
With dramatically different levels of preparation, largely
unsupported by government funding, with those least prepared
teaching the most educationally vulnerable children;
•
At sharply disparate and often inadequate salaries—with those
teaching in the poorest communities earning the least,
stimulating a revolving door of underprepared teachers;
•
With little or no mentoring, on-the-job coaching, or embedded
professional learning opportunities in most communities.”
Id. at 1–2.
231. See OFF. LEGIS. AUDITOR, supra note 225.
232. MINN. STAT. § 122A.414, subdiv 1(a)–(b) (2017). See Christopher Magan,
Twin Cities Parents Continue Argument That Unions Protect Bad Teachers, Hurt
Education, PIONEER PRESS (June 29, 2017, 8:35 AM), http://www.twincities.com/
2017/06/29/twin-cities-parents-continue-argument-that-unions-protect-bad-teache
rs-hurt-educat ion [https://perma.cc/D88P-UDTW]; Annette Meeks, State of the
Unions: Let Public School Teachers Decide If They Want Representation, or Not, STAR
TRIB. (Jan. 8, 2016, 9:26 AM), http://www.startribune.com/state-of-the-unions-letpublic-school-teachers-decide-if-they-want-representation-or-not/364582951 [https:
// perma.cc/ PR9G-9YW4].
233. MINN. STAT. § 122A.414, subdiv. 2(a)–(b) (2008) (requiring that a school
district’s application to enter the Q Comp program be “submitted jointly by a district
and the exclusive representative of the teachers. Charter schools, which are not
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Although the Q Comp program is based on necessary structural
reforms, the Governor capped the amount of money allocated to
these reforms.234 Legislative leaders also bowed to pressure from the
labor movement to make the reforms because doing so would
require the assent of teachers in a collective bargaining
agreement.235 Education Minnesota, a public school employee
union, urged its locals to agree to a Q Comp program only if the
CBA contained an annual escape clause so that the local union could
end the program if the union felt that the program was invading
labor objectives.236 The statewide amount of aid for the program is
capped at $88.118 million for fiscal year 2017 and later.237
The validity of proposals to change Minnesota’s delivery system
is beyond the scope of this article. However, Minnesota fails to
provide school district management the power to reorganize and
retool schools in accord with research on best practices, especially
practices required to meet disadvantaged students’ needs. To make
Minnesota’s broken education system work for the economically
disadvantaged, a suit under the Education Clause must force the
legislature to provide both school district revenues and school
district management power sufficient to achieve their statutory
mission. It is imperative for the executive branch to submit budgets
adequate to the task in odd numbered years and policy reforms
adequate to the task in even numbered years.
unionized, must hold a vote of their teachers in which at least 70 percent support
the Q Comp plan submitted in the application”); MINN. STAT. § 122A.415, subdiv.
1(b) (2008). The “exclusive representative of the teachers” is typically a
representative of the teachers’ union. See MINN. STAT. § 179A.03, subdiv. 8; see also
Magan, supra note 232 (“Last month, state lawmakers agreed to a minor change that
will require districts and union leaders to negotiate local policies governing teacher
layoffs by 2019.”).
234. See OFF. LEGIS. AUDITOR, supra note 225, at 7.
235. Id.
236. HOW TO UNDERSTAND A Q COMP SALARY SCHEDULE AND ENSURE IT STILL
EXISTS IF Q COMP (ATPPS) GOES AWAY IN 5 EASY STEPS,
https://www.educationminnesota.org/EDMN/media/edmn-files/advocacy/atpps
/how-to-understand-qcomp-salary-schedule.pdf [https://perma.cc/HD3Z-Q5X6]
(last visited Nov. 21, 2017). See, e.g., Q-Comp Memo of Understanding Letter of
Agreement—Alternative Compensation Plan 2016-17, EDEN PRAIRIE SCHOOLS,
https://www.edenpr.org/cms/lib/MN01909581/Centricity/Domain/44/2016-20
17%20Q-Comp.pdf [https://perma.cc/KJL9-2X7U] (providing that “the School
District and the Association agree . . . to enter into a one-year Letter of Agreement
that includes a professional compensation system [Q Comp]”).
237. A GUIDE FOR LEGISLATORS, supra note 149, at 94.
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D.

Cruz-Guzman and Forslund Suits Challenging Discrete System
Components

Across the country, almost all state education clause litigations
involve attempts to seek fairness in the apportionment of state and
local funding (equity suits)238 or increases in the overall funding
provided to districts with high populations of economically
disadvantaged students (adequacy suits).239 School districts or their
allies design adequacy suits to assure that school districts have
sufficient funds to deliver an education that meets state standards
found in state law.240 In states where the legislature has not set state
standards in law, courts have fashioned standards regarding the
education necessary for graduates to function effectively in modern
society.241 Influenced by the national proficiency movement, some
238. See Campbell Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1251, 1264 (Wyo. 1995)
(determining whether Wyoming’s method for funding schools was “equitable”);
Abbott v. Burke, 495 A.2d 376, 379–81 (N.J. 1985) (determining whether the
combination of inadequate local tax base and the low contributions to schools from
the state resulted in a violation of New Jersey’s education clause); Washakie Cty.
Sch. Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 334 (Wyo. 1980) (“It is our view that
until equality of financing is achieved, there is no practicable method of achieving
equality of quality.”).
239. See Conn. Coalition for Just. in Educ. Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 990 A.2d 206,
244–50 (Conn. 2010) (discussing adequacy decisions of other states); History of
Abbott v. Burke, EDUC. L. CTR., http://www.edlawcenter.org/cases/abbott-vburke/abbott-history.html [https://perma.cc/4YSW-5UZG] (last visited Dec. 1,
2017). See generally Michael A. Rebell, Educational Adequacy, Democracy and the Courts,
in ACHIEVING HIGH EDUCATIONAL STANDARDS FOR ALL: CONFERENCE SUMMARY 218
(Timothy Ready et al., eds., 2002).
240. See Daarel Burnette II, School Finance Suits: More Than Just a Legal Roll of
Dice?, EDUC. WEEK (May 31, 2016), https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2016/06/
01/school-finance-suits-more-than-just-a.html [https://perma.cc/BUG6-AV5K].
241. For example, the Massachusetts Supreme Court stated:
An educated child must possess “at least the seven following capabilities:
(i) sufficient oral and written communication skills to enable students
to function in a complex and rapidly changing civilization; (ii) sufficient
knowledge of economic, social, and political systems to enable students
to make informed choices; (iii) sufficient understanding of
governmental processes to enable the student to understand the issues
that affect his or her community, state, and nation; (iv) sufficient selfknowledge and knowledge of his or her mental and physical wellness;
(v) sufficient grounding in the arts to enable each student to appreciate
his or her cultural and historical heritage; (vi) sufficient training or
preparation for advanced training in either academic or vocational
fields so as to enable each child to choose and pursue life work
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courts required funding adequate to assure that students achieve an
education sufficient to meet state proficiency standards.242
However, in a few recent cases, advocacy groups have styled suits
as adequacy suits that are not really adequacy suits.243 In this new
brand of suit, the plaintiff is not attempting to empower school
districts (financially or otherwise) to educate all students to state
required standards. Rather, the plaintiff is seeking to change one
aspect of the education system by alleging that the plaintiff-students
will receive some benefit from this change. In doing so, these suits
suffer from two fundamental flaws. First, these suits fail to root the
claims on the legislature’s failure “to make such provisions . . . as will
secure a thorough and efficient system of public schools throughout
the state.”244 Second, these suits attack merely one isolated, discrete
part of the larger education system rather than attempting to fix the
system itself.
As to the first fundamental flaw, the Minnesota legislature
comprehensively established rigorous academic proficiency

intelligently; and (vii) sufficient level of academic or vocational skills to
enable public school students to compete favorably with their
counterparts in surrounding states, in academics or in the job market.”
McDuffy v. Sec’y of Exec. Off. of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 554 (Mass. 1993) (quoting
Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989)).
242. See Gannon v. State, 368 P.3d 1024, 1031 (Kan. 2017) (ruling that the state
must fund education that meets the test from Rose v. Council for Better Education, as
well as legislatively established standards); Montoy v. State, 102 P.3d 1160, 1164
(Kan. 2005) (concluding that “accreditation standards may not always adequately
define a suitable education,” but examination of the legislature’s definition of
suitable education leads to the conclusion that “the standard is not being met under
the current financing formula”); Columbia Falls Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 6 v. State, 109
P.3d 257, 261 (Mont. 2005) (“Because the Constitution mandates that the
Legislature provide a quality education, we determine that the Legislature can best
construct a ‘quality’ system of education if it first defines what is a ‘quality’ system
of education.”); Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 316 (Minn. 1993) (“Because the
present system provides uniform funding to each student in the state in an amount
sufficient to generate an adequate level of education which meets all state standards,
the state has satisfied its constitutionally-imposed duty of creating a ‘general and
uniform system of education).
243. See, e.g., Forslund v. State, No. A17-0033, 2017 WL 3864082 (Minn. Ct. App.
Sept. 5, 2017); Cruz-Guzman v. State, 892 N.W.2d 533 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017);
Vergara v. State, 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d 532 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016) (using adequacy
provision of state’s constitution to attack teacher tenure, dismissal, and layoff
policies).
244. MINN. CONST. art XIII, § 1.
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standards and costly programmatic requirements.245 There can be
little doubt that Minnesota’s education system is failing to educate
students to those standards.246 But, in neither of these suits did the
plaintiffs assert that the state had failed to meet legislatively
established academic proficiency and programmatic standards; they
did not even mention those standards.247 Moreover, in neither case
did the plaintiffs ask the courts to require the state to provide
adequate resources to meet the unidentified standards.248 Lastly,
neither Cruz-Guzman nor Forslund directly connected the claimed
educational deficiencies to the Skeen test: “what is necessary to
provide an adequate level of education which meets all state
standards.”249
The two panels confronting these two litigations must have been
bewildered at being asked to adjudicate a dispute about students’
failure to achieve high standards when they were not told what those
standards are or where they come from. Both appellate panels
dismissed the two cases on the grounds that the legislature, not the
courts, must establish the operative standards for the public
education delivery system.250
Importantly, however, both panel decisions were issued in
apparent ignorance of Minnesota’s rigorous educational standards.
As a consequence, on appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court will be
245. See MINN. STAT. §§ 120B.11, 120B.021 (2017).
246. In December 2017, a coalition of metropolitan school superintendents,
under the umbrella of the Association of Metropolitan School Districts, issued their
“Reimagine Minnesota” draft report stating that “[o]ur K-12 education system is the
foundation for the upcoming workforce yet our educational data and statistics show
that schools and districts need to improve all of the educational markers that serve
as benchmarks of success in the current educational system.” Reimagine Minnesota,
ASSOC. OF METRO. SCHOOL DIST. (Dec. 2017), http://www.amsd.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/12/Reimagine-MN-Roadmap-for-Action.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/ET9D-RNUX].
247. See Complaint, Forslund v. State, 62-CV-16-2161, 2016 WL 8608311 (Minn.
Dist. Ct. May 2, 2016); Complaint, Cruz-Guzman v. Minnesota, 27-CV-15-19917, 2015
WL 6774682 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Nov. 5, 2015).
248. See Complaint, Forslund v. State, 62-CV-16-2161, 2016 WL 8608311 (Minn.
Dist. Ct. May 2, 2016); Complaint, Cruz-Guzman v. Minnesota, 27-CV-15-19917, 2015
WL 6774682 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Nov. 5, 2015).
249. Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 316 (Minn. 1993).
250. Forslund v. State, No. A17-0033, 2017 WL 3864082, at *9 (“[R]esolution of
appellant’s claims . . . ‘is a task for the legislature and not the judiciary’. . . .”); CruzGuzman v. State, 892 N.W.2d 533, 541 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017) (dismissing
respondent’s claims because they presented a nonjusticiable political question).
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reviewing these two cases on an inadequate legal framework. Since
the appellate court panels were shielded from the existence of state
educational standards, the panel decisions (if affirmed) will be of no
precedential value in a case where the plaintiffs rely on the actual
legislative education standards.251 Accordingly, these decisions do
not impair a future student’s right to challenge the legislature’s
failure to provide funding necessary to provide an education in
conformance with legislatively established state standards.
A second fundamental flaw in the Cruz-Guzman and Forslund
cases arises from the plaintiffs’ attempts to use the Education Clause
to challenge discrete features of Minnesota’s education system.252
Merely changing a single component part of our system cannot
possibly produce an education that meets state educational
standards.253 This is not to suggest that concerns about racial
isolation and the tenure system are insignificant. However, neither
eliminating the tenure and seniority system nor attempting to
integrate racially isolated schools would end the achievement gap.
Public schools are complex systems; fixing them requires providing
management adequate financing and with comprehensive tools to
run them effectively.
There are many educational policies that arguably have a
negative impact on educational results, and educational advocacy
groups of all types have varying positions on which policies are better
than others—but these policies do not raise constitutional
concerns.254 A school’s textbook selection committee might choose
251. See Forslund, 2017 WL 3864082, at *1; Cruz-Guzman, 892 N.W.2d at 533.
252. See Forslund, 2017 WL 3864082, at *1; Cruz-Guzman, 892 N.W.2d. at 533.
253. See, e.g., Forslund, 2017 WL 3864082, at *3 (citing appellant’s argument
“that the teacher-tenure statutes result in the assignment of an ineffective teacher
to some students and not to others, and thus limit their children’s fundamental
right to an adequate education”); Cruz-Guzman, 892 N.W.2d at 535 (describing the
parents’ complaint alleging that racial segregation of the school caused its “racial
achievement gap,” suggesting that racially integrating the school would close the
achievement gap).
254. For example, in New Jersey, Governor Christie filed a motion in the abovediscussed Abbott litigation requesting the New Jersey Supreme Court to modify the
plaintiff’s relief. See History of Abbott v. Burke, EDUC. L. CTR.,
http://www.edlawcenter.org/cases/abbott-v-burke/abbott-history.html [https://
perma.cc/4YSW-5UZG] (last visited Dec. 1, 2017). Governor Christie wanted the
Commissioner of Education to be able to override collective bargaining agreements
to the extent the Commissioner determines that they impede the delivery of a
thorough and efficient education in certain School Development Authority (SDA)
districts. Id. The governor’s motion primarily focused on certain aspects of
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a textbook that is not ideal for all students, and the selection of a
different textbook might allegedly result in a superior education for
disadvantaged students. A claim that asserts that selection of the
allegedly inferior textbook impairs achievement of state proficiency
norms clearly ought not to be heard by the courts under the
constitutional clause. Similarly, a suit that seeks to advance an
organization’s advocacy for a specific education reform (such as
integration, tenure, or seniority reform) should not state a claim
under Minnesota’s education clause. This is because a single isolated
reform, no matter how beneficial, cannot alone make the system
achieve state standards.255
In Forslund v. State, parents of students attending urban school
districts alleged that Minnesota’s Continuing Contract Law256 and
Tenure Act257 violated the Minnesota Education Clause.258 The
parents alleged that Minnesota schools hired and retained
ineffective teachers at alarming rates.259 The Minnesota complaint
was modelled heavily on a parallel litigation, Vergara v. California,
which contended that in California five percent of teachers in the
school districts were grossly ineffective, yet were retained in
preference to other teachers who were more effective.260 In Vergara,
a state district court held that tenure and seniority laws caused the
allocation of ineffective tenured teachers disproportionately to
disadvantaged students, thereby impairing their educational
success.261 However, the California Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that management practices, not tenure laws, were the direct
and proximate cause of such retention and assignment of ineffective
collectively negotiated agreements and provisions of state law, including teacher
tenure statutes. In January 2017, the court dismissed Governor Christie’s motion.
Id.
255. See Connecticut Coal. for Justice in Educ. Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 990 A.2d
206, 255 (Conn. 2010) (“In order to succeed in the specific context of this case,
plaintiffs will have to establish a causal link between the present funding system and
any proven failure to provide a sound basic education . . . .” (citing Campaign for
Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 655 N.E.2d 661, 667 (N.Y. 1995))).
256. MINN. STAT. § 122A.40 (2017).
257. Id. § 122A.41 (2017).
258. See Complaint ¶16, Forslund v. State, 62-CV-16-2161, 2016 WL 8608311
(Minn. Dist. Ct. May 2, 2016).
259. See id. ¶¶ 56–68.
260. Complaint pt. B ¶ 37, Vergara v. California, 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d 532 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2016).
261. See Vergara v. California, No. BC484642, 2014 WL 2598719 at *5 (Cal.
Super. Ct. June 10, 2015).
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teachers.262 If grossly ineffective teachers are retained and granted
tenure after three years (as is the Minnesota requirement),263 one
needs to look to causes other than the ineffective teachers
themselves. The Minnesota Court of Appeals did not get even this
far, dismissing the plaintiffs claims as nonjusticiable.264 Forslund and
Vergara reveal that even if a component of the education system may
be flawed, one is unlikely to be successful suing to change that single
component rather than the system itself.
In Cruz-Guzman, the plaintiffs alleged that Minneapolis and
Saint Paul were failing to provide students with an “adequate”
education because city schools are segregated on the basis of race
and socioeconomic status.265 Although school integration is
supported by some advocates as a tactic arguably leading to better
educational results, the plaintiffs sought to represent all students
enrolled or to be enrolled in the two districts during the pendency
of the litigation, including families who would oppose this reform.266
The plaintiffs alleged education in a racially or economically isolated
school is, per se, a constitutionally inadequate education, although
the legislature has carefully avoided including that requirement in
its legislative mandates.267 They further alleged that segregation by
race and socioeconomic status in the Minneapolis and Saint Paul
public school system has resulted in low graduation rates for students
of color, depressed proficiency scores, and placed some students at
an educational disadvantage.268 Plaintiffs then alleged that the
262. Vergara v. State, 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d 532, 538 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016) (“Plaintiffs
failed to establish that the challenged statutes violate equal protection, primarily
because they did not show that the statutes inevitably cause a certain group of
students to receive an education inferior to the education received by other students
because . . . plaintiffs failed to show that the statutes themselves make any certain
group of students more likely to be taught by ineffective teachers than any other
group of students.”).
263. MINN. STAT. § 122A.40, subdiv. 5 (2017).
264. Forslund, 2017 WL 3864082, at *9 (“[R]esolution of appellant’s claims . . .
‘is a task for the legislature and not the judiciary’. . . .”).
265. See Cruz-Guzman, 892 N.W.2d at 533.
266. Id. at 535.
267. Id.
268. Compl. ¶ 36, Cruz-Guzman v. Minnesota, 27-CV-15-19917, 2015 WL
6774682 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Nov. 5, 2015). The complaint stated:
[F]or 2014, 23.2 percent of Black (not of Hispanic origin) students in
Minneapolis public schools demonstrated proficiency in reading, 22.7
percent demonstrated proficiency in mathematics, and 12.5 percent
demonstrated proficiency in science. For 2014, 25.2 percent of Black
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educational output of those schools is “inadequate because it is
substandard by any reasonably, widely accepted measure, and
because it is unequal to the education being provided in
surrounding suburban school districts.”269 Notice again that this
allegation fails to reference the legislature’s own education
standards.270 The complaint vaguely asked the court to order the
defendants to “remedy the violations of law set forth hereinabove[,]”
and to order the defendants “to provide the [plaintiffs] forthwith
with an adequate and desegregated education.”271
The district court accepted these allegations as true during the
Rule 12 stage, denying the State’s motion to dismiss.272 As to the
underlying claim, the research is mixed on the extent to which
segregation is correlated with achievement, and more importantly,
whether any such correlation derives from integration or from actual
school practices in the integrated schools.273 Nonetheless, the court
of appeals reversed, holding the claim a nonjusticiable political
question because establishing qualitive education standards is a
legislative function.274 Like in Vergara and Forslund, while research
supported plaintiffs’ claims, attacking a small component of the
larger educational system proved unsuccessful.
Moreover, in Cruz-Guzman, the parties failed to tell the court,
and the court failed to recognize, that the legislature intentionally
(not of Hispanic origin) students in Saint Paul public schools
demonstrated proficiency in reading, 24.4 percent demonstrated
proficiency in mathematics, and 14 percent demonstrated proficiency in
science. These results compared negatively with statewide averages for
all students of 58.8 percent, 60.5 percent, and 53.4 percent respectively.
These results for Black students also compared negatively with
proficiency of white Minneapolis students of 77.7 percent in reading,
76.1 percent in mathematics, and 71.1 percent in science, and with
proficiency of white Saint Paul students of 72 percent in reading, 67
percent in mathematics, and 64.2 percent in science.
Id.
269. Id.
270. See generally Academic Standards, supra note 76.
271. Cruz-Guzman, 832 N.W.2d at 535.
272. Id. at 534–35.
273. See, e.g., Eric A. Hanushek & Steve G. Rivkin, Harming the Best: How Schools
Affect the Black-White Achievement Gap, 28 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS MGMT. 366 (2009); David
Card & Jesse Rothstein, Racial Segregation and the Black-White Test Score Gap, 91 J. PUB.
ECON. 11 (2007); Michael D. Cook & William N. Evans, Families or Schools? Explaining
the Convergence in White and Black Academic Performance, 18 J. LAB. ECON. 729 (2000).
274. Id. at 541.
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omitted from the governing statutes language forcing schools to
integrate.275 This may explain the court of appeals’ otherwise
inexplicable assertion that “respondents have not identified, and we
do not ascertain, any ‘judicially discoverable and manageable
standards’ for resolving respondents’ inadequate-education
claims.”276 The court then stated “judicial action must be governed
by standard, by rule. Laws promulgated by the Legislative Branch can
be inconsistent, illogical, and ad hoc; law pronounced by the courts
must be principled, rational, and based upon reasoned
distinctions.”277
The court was correct that the standards and rules must govern
judicial action.278 But, the claim that the laws evaluated under the
Education Clause are “inconsistent, illogical, and adhoc”279 is a
sweeping, indefensible assertion. The court borrowed this language
from Vieth,280 a gerrymandering case in which the United States
Supreme Court refused to interfere with Pennsylvania’s
congressional redistricting because it was inherently ad hoc.281
This gerrymandering dicta282 should not be applied to the
legislature’s responsibility under an Education Clause because this
responsibility creates a fundamental right.283 Minnesota’s
Constitution demands that the legislature make provisions for a
system of public education that is “thorough and efficient” and
“general and uniform.”284 Asserting that the legislature can meet its
responsibility in an “inconsistent, illogical, and ad hoc” way is hardly
founded on any standard or rule.285 How could the legislature meet
its solemn responsibility to create a thorough and efficient, general
and uniform system in an ad hoc, inconsistent, and illogical fashion?
The application of gerrymandering law to the administration of the
education system seems fairly indefensible.

275. See MINN. STAT. § 124D.855 (2017); see also MINN. R. ch. 3535 (2017).
276. Cruz-Guzman, 892 N.W.2d at 540.
277. Id. (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004)).
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 278.
281. The Supreme Court’s approach to gerrymandering is now subject to
reconsideration in Gill v. Whitford. 137 S. Ct. 2289 (2017).
282. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 278.
283. See Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 301 (Minn. 1993).
284. MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1.
285. Cruz-Guzman v. State, 892 N.W.2d 533, 540 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017).
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Nonetheless, one can be sympathetic to the court’s frustration.
The plaintiffs asked the court to find a standard based on principled,
rational, and reasoned distinctions.286 Yet, the plaintiffs failed to rely
on the legislative standard for delivery of education and seemingly
asked the court to invent the definition of adequate education out
of whole cloth. Constitutional issues under the Education Clause
arise when the governor and legislature fail to provide adequate
funding and adequate managerial powers for the legislatively
required educational standards that schools must deliver.287 Courts
cannot adjudicate claims that do not rely on the legislative standard
found in law.288
Under Skeen, a claim that segregated schools violate the
constitutional guarantee of an education that meets state standards
would require the plaintiffs to show either (1) that integrating
schools will result in an education that meets state proficiency and
other educational standards, or (2) that integrated schools are part
of the state established education standards.289 The Cruz-Guzman
plaintiffs did neither. On the first issue, they failed to ground their
complaint on (or even reference) the existing legislative proficiency
standards.290 On the second issue, they could not ground their claim
on state school integration standards, because the state school
integrations statute, Chapter 124D, contains no desegregation
mandate.291 Thus, rather than finding the claim nonjusticiable, the
Cruz-Guzman court could have simply recognized and relied upon
the legislature’s decision to not demand integration.292
286. Id. (quoting Vieth, 541 U.S. at 278 (2004)).
287. “Appellants argue that the . . . Education Clause sets forth the legislature’s
duty to establish a ‘general and uniform system of public schools.’” Id. at 538.
Additionally, the Minnesota Supreme Court noted that the Education Clause “does
not state that the legislature must provide an education that meets a certain
qualitative standard.” Id.
288. See id. at 541 (finding that respondents’ claims “present[ed] a
nonjusticiable political question”).
289. Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 312, 316 (Minn. 1993).
290. See Complaint, Cruz-Guzman v. Minnesota, 27-CV-15-19917, 2015 WL
6774682 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Nov. 5, 2015).
291. See MINN. STAT. § 124D.861 (2016) (listing legislative educational purposes,
including goals to “pursue racial and economic integration” and “reduce academic
disparities based on students’ diverse racial, ethnic, and economic backgrounds in
Minnesota public schools”); MINN. STAT. § 124D.896 (2014) (identifying this section
as “Desegregation/Integration and Inclusive Education Rules”).
292. See MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1 (“The legislature shall make such provisions
by taxation or otherwise as will secure a thorough and efficient system of public
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This leads us to the central thesis of this article: that the two
most recent constitutional litigations, Forsland and Cruz-Guzman,
failed to bring a compelling and winning constitutional case.
Moreover, Minnesota has failed to provide the funding and
management powers necessary to educate our students to the state
standards adopted by the legislature. When will someone bring that
compelling case?
V. CONCLUSION: MINNESOTA SCHOOL DISTRICTS AND THEIR ALLIES
CAN ENFORCE THE CONSTITUTIONAL EDUCATION CLAUSE
Minnesota’s education system will never close the achievement
gap until the judicial branch acts decisively to require the executive
and legislative branches to implement practices that enable
achievement of state standards. To accomplish that objective, an
appropriate plaintiff could bring a constitutional claim that respects
the constitutional role of each of the three branches. Six principles
would support such a case.
First, the Minnesota legislature already defined the term
“academic standard” in legislation.293 That definition could provide
the starting point for litigation, since the legislature’s statutory
framework clearly passes the standards for judicial review of
legislation.294
Second, Minnesota’s schools are not meeting state-established
educational standards. This is because the legislature has failed to
create a funding and operational framework that enables schools
that serve economically disadvantaged students to meet the
standards it has established.295 There is compelling evidence that
with adequate resources and proper management, schools can

schools throughout the state.”).
293. MINN. STAT. § 120B.018, subdiv. 2 (2017).
294. See McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227, 257 (Wash. 2012) (en banc) (“[T]he
legislature devised a basic education system to provide the constitutionally required
‘education’ . . . .”); Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 315 (Minn. 1993) (“In this case,
the available evidence suggests . . . that there is a fundamental right under the
Education Clause, to a ‘general and uniform system of education’ . . . . In evaluating
a challenge to such a fundamental right, this court must employ the strict scrutiny
test.”).
295. MINN. STAT. § 120B.021 (2017); Minnesota Issues Resource Guides: Academic
Standards, MINN. LEGIS. REFERENCE LIBR., https://www.leg.state.mn.us/lrl/guides/g
uides?issue=academic [https://perma.cc/HWB2-S8SA] (last visited Nov. 28, 2017).
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dramatically improve achievement for disadvantaged students.296
Once the “demographic excuse” is abandoned, there is both a moral
and constitutional imperative to act.
Third, it is not the role of the judiciary to micromanage public
education by allowing interest groups to attack individual flaws in
the system piecemeal.297 A constitutional challenge should focus on
making the whole system work. To accomplish that objective, the
executive and legislative branches must function rationally to
operate the system in a more effective manner.
Fourth, the courts should require the executive branch to
radically reform the procedure for education budget preparation.
Each budget should be fashioned from hard financial data and
provide the legislature with the revenue figure necessary to
accomplish the mission assigned to school districts by the legislature
itself.298 That budget should be prepared by a cadre of persons within
an independent budgetary department that has the professional
competence to provide accurate costing of proven delivery systems.
Fifth, finance committee hearings on the education budget
should no longer focus on legislators’ favorite new initiative. Instead,
committees should scrutinize the executive branch’s determination
of the revenues (including allocation of those revenues) needed to
accomplish legislatively established educational goals. These
hearings, along with the record of an independent executive
department, could provide a rational basis for legislative action.
Finally, the collective bargaining system in Minnesota must be
reformed to prevent collective bargaining from invading school
management’s ability to meet its constitutional responsibility.299 This

296. See generally CHENOWETH & THEOKAS, supra note 98 (describing what leaders
of successful high-poverty and high-minority schools have done to promote and
sustain student achievement); CHENOWETH, supra note 19 (describing how school
leaders improved outcomes for low income students and students of color).
297. See Connecticut Coal. for Justice in Educ. Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 990 A.2d
206, 255 (Conn. 2010) (“[I]n order to succeed in the specific context of this case,
plaintiffs will have to establish a causal link between the present funding system and
any proven failure to provide a sound basic education.” (quoting Campaign for
Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 86 N.Y.2d 307, 318 (1995))).
298. See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke, 495 A.2d 376, 385–87 (N.J. 1985) (detailing how
funding formula inadequacies violate the state right to education).
299. See FORDHAM INST., supra note 146, at 15–16, 26 (discussing how school
leaders are constrained by collective-bargaining agreements when making decisions
regarding things like staffing structures, hiring decisions, academic programs to
offer, and non-academic services).
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is not a call for abolition of collective bargaining, but rather a call to
prevent the bargaining power from interfering with the delivery of
constitutionally required education.300 Management must have the
unrestrained power to organize the delivery of instruction consistent
with best practices.301 Of course, that power should not be exercised
in a top-down manner. But, our system of education cannot be
required to meet its constitutional responsibility only upon the
permission of employees.302 School districts must be prohibited from
making cuts to fund labor settlements. And, the legislature must, in
conjunction with this reform, begin separately to budget adequate
funding increases for teacher compensation sufficient to attract and
retain excellent teachers.
A.

Implementation of Constitutional Mandate Begins with Legislative
Educational Standards

In McCleary, as in other adequacy cases, the court attempted to
develop an approach to funding adequacy that harnesses the
respective roles of the legislature, judiciary, and executive
branches.303 The lynchpin of the McCleary decision is the
requirement that the legislature begins the process of implementing
the constitutional mandate by determining what a twenty-first
century education requires.304 The legislative determination as to
what education is mandated under state law is entitled to traditional
judicial deference,305 but that determination should not be
300. See id. at 26 (concluding that there must be revisions—not a clear-cut
removal—to these existing regulations and contracts to enable maximum flexibility
and allow compliance with constitutionally required education responsibilities such
as adherence to the No Child Left Behind Act).
301. See id. (discussing how school districts need to make spending decisions as
easy as possible for schools at the base—the teachers—to send a message that they
have the authority to make decisions and tradeoffs based on their individualized
needs and requirements).
302. Id. (“Another reason to embrace autonomy is that buy-in . . . is likely to be
stronger when local education leaders have more say in how funds are spent.”).
303. McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227, 258 (Wash. 2012) (“The other reason that
the remedy question proves elusive has to do with the delicate balancing of powers
and responsibilities among coordinate branches of government.”).
304. See id. at 247 (“[T]he Legislature is obligated to give specific substantive
content to the word [‘education’] and to the program it deems necessary to provide
that ‘education’ within the broad guidelines.” (quoting Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v.
State, 585 P.2d 71, 95 (Wash. 1978)).
305. See, e.g., Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 333 (1993); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf
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completely immunized from judicial review in appropriate
circumstances.
For example, imagine if the Minnesota legislature established
new state education standards based on the learning objectives
reflected in the century-old common school curriculum and
McGuffey’s Reader, or scaled back the public education system to
eighth grade. Surely the judiciary would not fail to act to force the
legislature to develop a more modern standard of education based
upon legislative facts and evidence. In either of these instances, it
seems unlikely that the court would hold that the legislature’s
implementation of our system of public education is completely
beyond judicial review.306 Those actions would defy the command
that the legislature act to create a thorough and efficient, general
and uniform system of public education.307
The Cruz-Guzman parties failed to advise the court that
Minnesota now has robust legislative educational standards. But, the
legislative process has certainly met constitutional requirements for
the first step of establishing a thorough and efficient system—setting
state educational standards.308 These legislative mandates are
founded on legislative facts, subject to a standard of review not yet
set by the Minnesota Supreme Court.309 Whatever the appropriate
standard of review, it is clear that the legislature has properly
adjusted the legislative mandates over the last century in response to
the economic, social, and political conditions of our time.310

Creamery Co.¸449 U.S. 456, 481–82 (1981).
306. See, e.g., Montoy v. State, 102 P.3d 1160, 1164 (2005) (referring explicitly to
legislative standards, but acknowledging that the legislature’s power to set standards
is not unlimited).
307. See MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1 (“The stability of a republican form of
government depending mainly upon the intelligence of the people, it is the duty of
the legislature to establish a general and uniform system of public schools. The
legislature shall make such provisions by taxation or otherwise as will secure a
thorough and efficient system of public schools throughout the state.”).
308. See supra note 2 (outlining state educational standards).
309. See Cruz-Guzman v. State, 892 N.W.2d 533, 538 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017)
(“[T]he word ‘adequate’ does not appear in Minnesota’s Education Clause.”).
310. Williams & Ebinger, supra note 160, at 4 (“During the 2014 legislative
session, lawmakers passed the nation’s most comprehensive legislation in support
of English Learners (ELs). The law has three principal goals for all EL students: a)
academic English proficiency, b) grade-level content knowledge, and c)
multilingual skills development. Chief among the mandates is the requirement that
all teachers be skilled in teaching ELs.”).
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Maintaining a Thorough and Efficient System Requires the Executive
Branch to Credibly Determine Resources Necessary to Meet State
Educational Standards

Fundamentally, this author argues that, for constitutional
reasons, Minnesota’s education budget cannot be based on the
traditional and incremental system.311 The current process begins
with budgetary decisions based on political allocation of revenues,
followed by frequent calls for fiscal discipline at the local level.312
However, this incremental approach only works when districts are
not expected to educate economically disadvantaged students to
high degrees of proficiency. Minnesota schools and districts simply
cannot deliver student proficiency with any degree of efficiency
through the current budgeting process.
Public schools operate like public utilities with public education
as their mission, instead of electricity, natural gas, or water. Public
schools serve an important public function, just like public utilities,
but their revenues are provided by the state on behalf of their
customers.313 Though the analogy is imperfect, when a public utility
asks for a revenue increase, the request begins with presentation of
financial and operational data. This information provides a basis for
an educated decision about how much revenue the utility needs.
Similarly, in the context of public education, the governor and the
Department of Education should offer information about school
district needs and educational outcomes. Playing the role of public
utilities commission, the legislature should then scrutinize this data.
It is unlikely that the courts would deem nonjusticiable a challenge
to a state statute directing Xcel Energy to deliver electricity to
customers for less than it costs to produce. This illustrates the
absurdity of unfunded mandates in other contexts. Indeed, if the
public utilities commission produced a regulation based on interest
group politics, the courts would almost certainly strike it down.
Budgetary requests by the state education system should be
similarly supported by cost-based data generated by the executive
branch’s independent cost experts. Sadly, no governor in recent

311. This section represents the author’s opinion and is based on his experience
working on school funding in Minnesota.
312. See Pugmire, supra note 203 (stating that local legislators are beginning to
object to state funding decisions that use tax increases to fund school districts). See
generally A GUIDE FOR LEGISLATORS, supra note 149.
313. See FINANCING EDUCATION, supra note 202.
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history has attempted to submit to the legislature a budget sufficient
to educate all students at the state-mandated levels.314 Disadvantaged
students are left short on funding.315 No commissioner of education
has compiled cost-based information and presented that data to the
governor as part of the budget process. As mentioned above, it seems
that Governors Pawlenty and Dayton were disinterested in the
cost-based model. The disinterest is evidenced by a failure to act
upon findings supporting a cost-based system and a seemingly
intentional structural constraining of their commission’s focus.316
This is the constitutional case that Minnesota school districts and
their counsel have failed to bring.
Basing budgetary recommendations on data would require a
different kind of staff at the Department of Education, with a
different mission, different expertise, and a different vision of their
responsibility under the constitution. For example, the Minnesota
Public Utilities Commission retains financial and policy analysts with
expertise in economics and finance. When confronted with costing
public utility services, the staff performs professionally, not
politically, because their decision on how much revenues the
regulated utility should receive is subject to judicial review based
upon an administrative record and the arbitrary and capricious
standard.317 These employees understand that it is not possible for a
public utility to deliver electricity below cost. Public schools likewise
cannot meet the statutory mandate when operating below cost.
Budgetary information supplied to the legislature should display this
level of competence and professionalism. If Minnesota is not
prepared to budget in this way, its claim to be concerned about the

314. See Magan, supra note 172 (“Many school advocates see a state funding
system that hasn’t kept pace with rising costs and has never fully met its obligations
to pay for special education and other mandated services.”); MEYERS ET AL., supra
note 14 (Minnesota underfunded schools by almost $1 billion, but that figure is
almost 12 years old).
315. MINN. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 1, at 4 (“There are wide gaps in reading
and math proficiency by race and by economic status. Little progress was made in
closing these achievement gaps between 2006 and 2010.”).
316. See supra Part IV.B.
317. See generally MINN. R. 7825.3800 (2017) (stating the financial information
required for rate adjustments in gas and electric utilities). See MINN. STAT. § 216B.16
(2017) (setting out the requirement for a hearing and hearing’s procedures with
respect to a utility rate change); In re Grand Rapids Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 731
N.W.2d 866, 870 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007) (applying an arbitrary and capricious
standard of review).
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achievement gap and a twenty-first century education is a
smokescreen—an instrument of self-deception.
The Minnesota Department of Education is not organized to
provide information on the cost of providing education because
nobody wants that answer. The legislature needs revenue and cost
information when it acts in budget years and when it acts in policy
years so that it can deliver adequate education. In the absence of
expertise in the executive branch, if the legislature wanted to know
how much revenue is required to deliver state mandates, it would
have to hire an outside expert such as the Augenblich firm that
developed the estimated two billion dollar budgetary shortfall
discussed above.318 A better way to develop a cost-based budget
would be to lodge that expertise in an independent executive branch
similar to a public utility commission economic and financial analysis
section. Currently, the budget presented to the legislature is not
based upon a rational determination of the cost of meeting state
standards, and the Minnesota Department of Education simply lacks
the capacity and expertise to provide that information.319 When, for
example, the legislature commanded that districts identify and
provide services to students with dyslexia,320 it received no
information on the cost and staffing implications of that new
initiative. As a consequence, Minnesota school districts were forced
by the new legislation to choose between cannibalizing funds from
other underfunded programs, or evading compliance with the new
mandate.321
We expect the public utility commission to determine utility
revenues, costs, and rates based on data and independent analysis.
Similarly, rate setting for the public utility we call “school” should be
based on sound data and independent professional judgments.
Research and experience shows that economically disadvantaged
students need more learning time, and that substantial resources are
needed before any dent in the achievement gap can be made. But,

See MEYERS ET AL., supra note 14.
CTR. FOR APPLIED RESEARCH & EDUC. IMPROVEMENT, MINNESOTA NEEDS
ASSESSMENT: RESEARCH, EVALUATION, ASSESSMENT, AND DATA USE IN SCHOOLS 12
(Theodore J. Christ & Kimberly Gibbons eds., 2016).
320. See MINN. STAT. § 120B.12, subdiv. 2 (2017) (requiring districts to provide
annual reporting on its efforts to screen and identify students with dyslexia).
321. Carolyn Lange, Unfunded School Mandates Questioned, W. CENTRAL TRIB.
(June 15, 2016, 11:46 PM), http://www.wctrib.com/news/education/4055828unfunded-school-mandates-questioned [http://perma.cc/K3H8-YSNC].
318.
319.
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Minnesota will never make that transformation until the executive
branch provides sufficient budgetary information to the legislature.
Furthermore, if research establishes that teachers need more
resources or more time to collaborate and analyze data, it is
preposterous that school districts be forced to obtain the consent of
a union to implement reforms necessary to achieve these results.322
Education, as Horace Mann foresaw, is the great equalizer of
the conditions of men and women—the balance-wheel of the social
machinery.323 Our economy is generating increasing inequality, and
a society that fails to provide economic opportunity broadly,
threatens to divide us into class and caste.324 This growing economic
divide is exactly what the authors of Minnesota’s constitution sought
to guard against, by installing an educational clause that speaks in
mandatory terms.325 Minnesota’s education system needs to be
reinvigorated with an ambitious litigation that remedies the state’s
failure to provide an education that meets state standards. It is high
time that the education community enforce the constitutional
mandate by bringing a litigation founded on an understanding of
what must be done to educate disadvantaged students.

322. See, e.g., Magan, supra note 232; Annette Meeks, State of the Unions: Let Public
School Teachers Decide If They Want Representation, or Not, STAR TRIB. (Jan. 8, 2016, 9:26
AM), http://www.startribune.com/state-of-the-unions-let-public-school-teachersdecide-if-they-want-representation-or-not/364582951
[https://perma.cc/U8LCWNDT]. See generally MINN. STAT. § 122A.414, subdiv. 1(a)–(b).
323. HORACE MANN, TWELFTH ANNUAL REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE
MASSACHUSETTS
STATE
BOARD
OF
EDUCATION
¶
10
(1848),
https://genius.com/Horace-mann-twelfth-annual-report-to-the-secretary-of-themassachusetts-state-board-of-education-1848-annotated [https://perma.cc/K3B5QJDH].
324. See generally id. (noting that Horace Mann thought education was the key
to economic equality).
325. See MINN. CONST. art. XI, § 8; MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1.
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